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JUDICIAL CANDIDATES’ RIGHT TO LIE 
NAT STERN 
 A large majority of state judges are chosen through some form 
of popular election.  In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 
the Supreme Court struck down a law forbidding certain judicial 
campaign speech.  A decade later, the Court in United States v. 
Alvarez ruled that factually false statements do not constitute cat-
egorically unprotected expression under the First Amendment.  To-
gether, these two holdings, along with the Court’s wider protection 
of political expression and disapproval of content-based re-
strictions, cast serious doubt on states’ ability to ban false and mis-
leading speech by judicial candidates.  Commonly known as the 
misrepresent clause, this prohibition has intuitive appeal in light 
of judges’ responsibilities and still exists in many states.  Given the 
provision’s vulnerability to challenge, however, states may be able 
to avert chronic fabrication by judicial candidates only by remov-
ing its ultimate source—judicial elections themselves. 
 
 “If the State chooses to tap the energy and the legitimizing power 
of the democratic process, it must accord the participants in that 
process . . . the First Amendment rights that attach to their roles.”1 
 
 “[A] State’s decision to elect its judiciary does not compel it to 
treat judicial candidates like campaigners for political office.”2 
INTRODUCTION 
It is virtually axiomatic that political candidates can lie with legal im-
punity.3  At the same time, the scheme of separation of powers and intuitions 
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 1.  Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (alteration in original) (quot-
ing Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 349 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). 
 2.  Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015). 
 3.  This phenomenon is perhaps most vividly illustrated by campaigns for the Nation’s highest 
office.  See THOMAS E. PATTERSON, OUT OF ORDER 3–27 (1993); see also KATHLEEN HALL 
JAMIESON, PACKAGING THE PRESIDENCY: A HISTORY AND CRITICISM OF PRESIDENTIAL 
CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING 408 (3d ed. 1996) (discussing a campaign ad that misquoted candidate’s 
opponent as saying, “nonproliferation of the control of nuclear weapons is none of our business”); 
Callum Borchers, Why the New York Times Decided It Is Now Okay to Call Donald Trump a Liar, 
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about justice point to a higher standard for those seeking election to judicial 
office.  Accordingly, laws in twenty-two states contain a “misrepresent 
clause” barring deliberately false factual statements by judicial candidates.4  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,5 
however, casts doubt on whether states may regulate judicial candidates’ 
speech.  While striking down only a single provision of Minnesota’s re-
strictions on judicial campaign speech, White evoked much speculation about 
                                                          
WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/09/22/why-
the-new-york-times-decided-it-is-now-okay-to-call-donald-trump-a-liar/ (pointing to candidate’s 
repeated claims that the President was not born in the United States);LARRY J. SABATO, FEEDING 
FRENZY 102–03 (1991) (discussing candidate’s lying about his age); Martin Schram, Nation’s 
Longest Campaign Comes to an End, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 1980), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/11/04/nations-longest-campaign-comes-to-an-end/6baf110a-
2aa6-4c26-aa92-6434c60e138e/ (noting candidate’s assertion that trees cause more pollution than 
automobiles).  The First Amendment status of laws barring false statements by political candidates 
is discussed infra Part I.A. 
 4.  ALA. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 7.B(2) (2004), http://judicial.alabama.gov/li-
brary/rules/can7.pdf; ALASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(iii) (2011), 
http://www.courtrecords.alaska.gov/webdocs/rules/docs/cjc.pdf; ARIZ. CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT r. 4.3 (2009), http://www.azcourts.gov/portals/137/rules/Ari-
zona%20Code%20of%20Judicial%20Conduct.pdf; FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
7(A)(3)(e)(ii) (2015), http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/decisions/ethics/Code_Judicial_Con-
duct.pdf; ILL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 67 (1994), https://www2.illinois.gov/sites/jib/docu-
ments/code%20of%20judicial%20conduct.pdf; KY. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 4.300, Canon 
5(B)(1)(c) (2015); MD. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 4.4(d)(5) (2016); MISS. CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(iii) (2002), https://courts.ms.gov/rules/msrulesofcourt/code_of_judi-
cial_conduct.pdf; MO. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2-4.2(A)(5) (2012), 
https://www.courts.mo.gov/courts/ClerkHand-
booksP2RulesOnly.nsf/c0c6ffa99df4993f86256ba50057dcb8/34f3bee06088a0fe86256ca6005212
35?OpenDocument; N.H. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 4.2 (2011); N.M. CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT r. 21-402(A)(2)(d) (2015); N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7.C(3) (2015); 
N.D. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(iii) (2012); OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT Canon 4, r. 4.3 (2017), http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/LegalResources/Rules/con-
duct/judcond0309.pdf; OKLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(iii) (2010); R.I. 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(iii) (2017); S.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(iii) (2017); S.D. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2013); TEX. 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(1)(ii) (2002), http://www.txcourts.gov/me-
dia/514728/TXCodeOfJudicialConduct_20020822.pdf; VT. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
5(B)(4)(c) (2011), https://www.vermontjudiciary.org/sites/default/files/docu-
ments/Text_of_A.O._10_Vt_Code_of_Judicial_Conduct.REFORMATTED.pdf; WIS. CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 60.06(3)(c) (2010), https://www.wicourts.gov/sc/scrule/DisplayDocu-
ment.html?content=html&seqNo=27626; WYO. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 4.2(B)(6) (2009), 
http://judicialconduct.wyo.gov/home/how-to-file-a-complaint/wyoming-code-of-judicial-conduct.  
In addition, California directs a judicial candidate to “take appropriate corrective action if the can-
didate learns of any misrepresentations made in his or her campaign statements or materials.”  CAL. 
CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 5(B)(2) (2016). 
 5.  536 U.S. 765 (2002).  The case is discussed infra Part II.B. 
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the potential invalidation of a broader swathe of such codes.6  Notwithstand-
ing this ominous outlook, though, the misrepresent clause was generally 
thought to be relatively secure from First Amendment challenge.7 
Contrary to such sanguine assessments, this Article argues that states’ 
attempts to bar falsehoods by judicial candidates stand on tenuous footing 
and are probably unconstitutional.  Of course, this interpretation does not im-
ply moral endorsement of the dishonesty that some who aspire to judicial 
office may practice.  Indeed, it does not even assume the wisdom of selecting 
judges through popular vote; cogent arguments have been offered against this 
peculiarly American institution.8  Rather, the thesis presented here reflects 
the extent to which the Court has shielded false expression and imported 
stringent protection of political speech into the judicial setting. 
Part I of this Article examines principles that appear to afford broad pro-
tection to falsehoods by judicial candidates.9  Of particular note is the Court’s 
                                                          
 6.  See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Judicial Campaign Codes After Republican Party of Minnesota 
v. White, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 181, 208–09 (2004); Katherine A. Moerke, Must More Speech Be the 
Solution to Harmful Speech? Judicial Elections After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 48 
S.D. L. REV. 262, 291–310 (2003); Roy A. Schotland, Should Judges Be More Like Politicians?, 
39 CT. REV. 8, 9–10 (2002); Nat Stern, The Looming Collapse of Restrictions on Judicial Campaign 
Speech, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 63, 111–29 (2008); Developments in the Law—Voting and De-
mocracy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1134 (2006) (stating “the future looks bleak” for advocates of 
campaign speech restrictions); see also infra note 275 and accompanying text. 
 7.  See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 6, at 221–22 (“Even if the Misrepresentations Clause does 
trigger strict scrutiny, the interest in informed electoral decision making is a compelling one and 
ought to justify such a restriction on candidate speech.”); Moerke, supra note 6, at 263 (“[T]he 
future of the misrepresent clause is the brightest of all.”); id. at 310–12; Schotland, supra note 6, at 
9–10 (omitting misrepresent clause from enumeration of provisions likely to face legal challenge); 
Walter M. Weber, Judicial Campaign Speech Restrictions: Some Litigation Nuts and Bolts, 68 ALB. 
L. REV. 635, 645 (2005) (describing misrepresent clause as “unassailable” as applied to provably 
false assertions); see also Michelle T. Friedland, Disqualification or Suppression: Due Process and 
the Response to Judicial Campaign Speech, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 563 (2004) (arguing in wake of 
White that availability of disqualification renders most or all restrictions on truthful campaign 
speech unconstitutional). 
 8.  See infra notes 227–241 and accompanying text. 
 9.  This reasoning applies only to restrictions aimed specifically at judicial candidates.  Can-
didates’ speech is not, of course, immune from valid general prohibitions on certain kinds of falsity: 
for example, defamation.  Further, this Article does not discuss whether a state could specifically 
bar misrepresentations by sitting judges seeking reelection under canons of judicial conduct.  As a 
preliminary observation, however, such a ban would still raise serious concerns.  While the state 
generally exercises greater control over speech within its own sphere—see, for example, Garcetti 
v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006)—the constitutional vulnerabilities of the limitations on judicial 
campaign speech discussed in this Article—especially those arising out of the protection of political 
speech, see infra Part I.A.2—would still apply.  In addition, disadvantaging one party in a political 
contest would presumably trigger the First Amendment’s heightened skepticism of content discrim-
ination.  See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2230 (2015); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 
U.S. 377, 383–84 (1992); Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447–49 (1991).  Particularly apposite 
here is the Court’s admonition that the state “has no . . . authority to license one side of a debate to 
fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.”  R.A.V., 505 U.S. 
at 392; see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 658 (1994) (“[L]aws favoring some 
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holding in United States v. Alvarez,10 which rejected the contention that fac-
tually false statements categorically receive no First Amendment recogni-
tion.11  Part II traces states’ widespread adoption of judicial elections, limita-
tions on judicial campaign speech enacted to counter threats to due process 
posed by candidates’ appeals to the electorate, and the reasoning in White 
that called such restrictions into question.  Part III is the heart of the Article.  
It describes how specific themes emerging from authority discussed in the 
first two parts militate against the misrepresent clause.  Finally, Part IV ex-
plains how two Court decisions that might be seen as bolstering the misrep-
resent clause—Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.12 and Williams-Yulee v. 
Florida Bar13—are better viewed as discrete rulings designed to address ex-
ceptional circumstances. 
I.  THE IMMUNITY OF FALSE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN SPEECH 
The Supreme Court has issued no comprehensive doctrine to govern 
false statements by political candidates.  This reticence is perhaps under-
standable in an area where two profound interests—shielding political dis-
course from factual distortion14 and protecting that discourse from govern-
ment interference—can collide.15  Still, Court rulings and pronouncements in 
this area tilt decidedly in favor of campaign speech unhampered by official 
arbitration of the truth.  Ultimately, the controlling principle appears to be 
that “[t]he State’s fear that voters might make an ill-advised choice does not 
provide the State with a compelling justification for limiting speech.”16 
                                                          
speakers over others demand strict scrutiny when the legislature’s speaker preference reflects a con-
tent preference. . . .”). 
 10.  567 U.S. 709 (2012). 
 11.  Id. at 721–22. 
 12.  556 U.S. 868 (2009). 
 13.  135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015). 
 14.  The impact that manufactured stories can have on political campaigns was highlighted by 
the unusual incidence of “fake news” during the 2016 presidential campaign.  See Elizabeth 
Dwoskin et al., Why Facebook and Google Are Struggling to Purge Fake News, WASH. POST (Nov. 
15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/why-facebook-and-google-are-
struggling-to-purge-fake-news/2016/11/15/85022897-f765-422e-9f53-c720d1f20071_story.html. 
 15.  See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 52 (1982) (“States have a legitimate interest in pre-
serving the integrity of their electoral processes. . . .  But when a State seeks to uphold that interest 
by restricting speech, the limitations on state authority imposed by the First Amendment are mani-
festly implicated.”); Helen Norton, Lies and the Constitution, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 161, 199 (While 
political candidates’ lies “pose . . . harms to their listeners . . . and may also . . . undermine public 
confidence in the integrity of the political process,” laws forbidding such lies “threaten significant 
First Amendment harms because they regulate expression in a context in which we especially fear 
government overreaching and partisan abuse. . . .”). 
 16.  Brown, 456 U.S. at 60. 
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A.  The Costs of False Political Campaign Speech and of Its Regulation 
The state possesses the authority to restrict false factual statements on a 
range of subjects as well as the grounds for asserting that power to combat 
the corrosive effects of political candidates’ lies.  Nevertheless, this authority 
is circumscribed by core First Amendment principles.  Most conspicuously, 
the extreme solicitude long given to political debate resists holding candi-
dates legally accountable for their misrepresentations. 
1.  Grounds for Prohibition 
Numerous restrictions on factually false assertions have long been ac-
cepted as compatible with the First Amendment’s protection of speech.  The 
roster of false expression that government proscribes includes fraud,17 per-
jury,18 false advertising,19 misrepresentation of material facts to the govern-
ment,20 impersonation of a government official,21 misrepresentation of mate-
rial facts in connection with the sale or purchase of securities,22 and 
defamation.23  Though some degree of mental culpability has typically been 
required to impose sanctions, government’s power to ban these kinds of false-
hoods has been firmly recognized.24 
The rationale for permitting suppression of such expression is essen-
tially twofold.  First, unlike everyday lies and deceptions that could be con-
sidered innocuous or even beneficial,25 the types of falsity that the govern-
ment has the right to forbid inflict self-evident or demonstrable harm.  An 
                                                          
 17.  E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012); ALA. CODE § 6-5-101 (LexisNexis 2014); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 30-16-6 (LexisNexis 2014). 
 18.  E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2012); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-8-502 (West 2013); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 16-10-70 (2011).  
 19.  E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012). 
 20.  E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012). 
 21.  E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 912 (2012). 
 22.  15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
 23.  E.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-11-1 (2016); Elliott v. Murdock, 385 P.3d 459, 465 (Idaho 
2016); Rice v. Alley, 791 A.2d 932, 936 (Me. 2002). 
 24.  See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 620 (2003) 
(sustaining state law banning fraud where State was required to show that “defendant made the 
representation with the intent to mislead the listener”); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 
193 (1976) (permitting private cause of action for damages under section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 where plaintiff can show defendant’s “intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud”). 
 25.  See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 733 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring) (observing 
that “in social contexts,” false factual statements may, inter alia, “prevent embarrassment, protect 
privacy, . . . or preserve a child’s innocence”); United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 673–75 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring) (reciting extensive catalogue of “white lies, exaggerations 
and deceptions,” that serve various social purposes), aff’d, 567 U.S. 709 (2012).  For the view that 
some types of lies—for example, “investigative deception”—warrant protection because they fur-
ther the aims of freedom of speech, see Alan K. Chen & Justin Marceau, High Value Lies, Ugly 
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obvious instance is securities fraud, where a false or misleading statement or 
omission induces a buyer or seller to incur monetary loss; indeed, a showing 
of damages is requisite to recovery.26  Even an injury like the offense that 
perjury gives to the integrity of the justice system,27 which might appear 
somewhat more abstract, also involves thwarting a court’s concrete goal of 
basing its judgment on accurate information.28 
In addition, the harms produced by proscribable speech do not lend 
themselves to the First Amendment’s normal corrective of open debate.  Jus-
tice Holmes famously articulated the preference for the metaphorical market-
place over official arbitration as a means of seeking truth: 
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, 
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very 
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is 
better reached by free trade in ideas—[and] that the best test of 
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the com-
petition of the market . . . .29 
As the Court has pointed out, however, false statements “interfere with 
the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas.”30  Moreover, it is in 
the nature of falsehoods that the state may bar that counterspeech will not 
suffice to cure their impact.  In many instances, the deception may go unde-
tected before it causes serious or even irreparable harm.  Thus, government 
may require sellers and advertisers to provide information that is not false or 
misleading rather than leave consumers to discover products’ flaws through 
second-hand reports or personal experience.31  In other instances, even 
prompt exposure may fail to avert or redress the injury.  The law of libel, for 
                                                          
Truths, and the First Amendment, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1435, 1454–56 (2015).  See also Norton, supra 
note 15, at 164–68. 
 26.  See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754–55 (1975). 
 27.  See United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 97 (1993). 
 28.  See In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945).  The requirement of harm as a crucial element 
in the power to suppress false speech is discussed in the analysis of United States v. Alvarez, 567 
U.S. 709 (2012),  infra Part I.B. 
 29.  Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Texas 
v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419 (1989) (“If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood 
and fallacies, to avert the [feared] evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is 
more speech, not enforced silence.” (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) 
(Brandeis, J., concurring))); Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 
72 YALE L.J. 877, 881 (1963) (stating as a principle justification for free expression that it is “the 
best process for advancing knowledge and discovering truth”). 
 30.  Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988). 
 31.  See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 
n.24 (1976). 
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example, rests largely on the assumption that the taint of defamatory false-
hood may persist in the face of even cogent rebuttal.32 
The rationales for permitting government to prohibit certain species of 
false statements might be thought to apply to political candidates’ misrepre-
sentations.33  Given the sharp constraint imposed by an election date, the mar-
ketplace of information may literally not have time to dispel false state-
ments.34  The definite date of a campaign’s close provides incentive for 
issuing misinformation at a point where the candidate attacked cannot effec-
tively counter the false claim.35  Moreover, the capacity of modern media to 
bombard citizens with factual misstatements may “normalize” falsity to such 
an extent that many cannot distinguish it from truth.36 
The effects of pervasive false campaign speech can be devastating, for 
they strike at the core premises of representative democracy.37  Most obvious 
is the degradation and distortion of electoral discourse.  One need not sub-
scribe to a romanticized view of the nation’s earliest political campaigns38 to 
                                                          
 32.  See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 n.9 (1974) (“[T]he law of defamation 
is rooted in our experience that the truth rarely catches up with a lie.”). 
 33.  As used here, the term “misrepresentation” does not encompass campaign promises that 
are not fulfilled after the candidate attains office.  Since it is impossible to objectively gauge the 
candidate’s intent at the time the promise was made, the statement would not be susceptible to 
objective refutation.  See Deupree v. Iliff, 860 F.2d 300, 303 (8th Cir. 1988) (statement about plain-
tiff’s motive treated as protected by the First Amendment); Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 
552 P.2d 425, 430 (Cal. 1976) (same); see also Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19–20 
(1990) (“[A] statement on matters of public concern must be provable as false before there can be 
liability under state defamation law, at least . . . where a media defendant is involved.”).  Even if 
the threshold for determining falsity were lowered, its demonstration would occur far too late for 
effective enforcement. 
 34.  See Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections/Politics Line, 77 TEX. L. 
REV. 1751, 1765 (1999) (“[T]he precise and temporal nature of an election places a premium on 
rules that promote careful and considered choice, a fair and effective electoral process, and a polit-
ically legitimate result.”). 
 35.  See William A. Williams, A Necessary Compromise: Protecting Electoral Integrity 
Through the Regulation of False Campaign Speech, 52 S.D. L. REV. 321, 351 (2007) (describing 
this as a tactic of “the opportunistic liar”). 
 36.  See Xiaoyan Qiu et al., Limited Individual Attention and Online Virality of Low-Quality 
Information, NATURE HUMAN BEHAVIOR, June 26, 2017, at 1. 
 37.  See Lee Goldman, False Campaign Advertising and the “Actual Malice” Standard, 82 
TUL. L. REV. 889, 895–97, 913–14 (2008). 
 38.  See, e.g., Libby Copeland, Stuck in the Muck, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2008), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/12/AR2008101201966.html (dis-
cussing the presidential contest of 1800 between Thomas Jefferson and John Adams). 
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credit the Framers with envisioning that representatives to the national gov-
ernment would be chosen through informed, rational debate.39  False cam-
paign assertions, typically against an opponent, vitiate that model.40  Moreo-
ver, attack ads of this nature can dominate campaigns, and not only because 
of their efficacy.41  In addition, even candidates who would not have initiated 
such attacks may feel compelled to respond in kind lest their opponents suc-
ceed in defining them in negative terms.42  The resulting barrage thus diverts 
campaigns from discussion of substantive issues.43  At least partly because of 
this unhealthy allocation of time and resources, the most visible media in turn 
tend to neglect these issues.44 
Of course, the ultimate damage that false campaign speech inflicts is not 
simply pollution of a high-minded ideal of political debate.  Rather, dissem-
ination of misinformation to the voting public threatens to defeat the very 
promise of democratic self-government.  The success of this system depends 
on the ability of citizens to make reasoned choices about the alternative vi-
sions they are offered.  Citizens who make these selections based on factually 
false beliefs are more likely to choose poor policies and inferior candidates.45 
Further, frequent false or deceptive claims by candidates and their sup-
porters generate subtler but profound harms transcending the outcome of a 
given election.  Repeated exposure to such claims may breed attitudes that 
erode the robust citizen engagement on which democracy thrives.  Citizens 
                                                          
 39.  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 344 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009); 
see also William P. Marshall, False Campaign Speech and the First Amendment, 153 U. PA. L. 
REV. 285, 294 (2004) (“Democracy is premised on an informed electorate.”). 
 40.  See Marshall, supra note 39, at 294 (“[T]o the extent that false ads misinform the voters, 
they interfere with the process upon which democracy is based.”). 
 41.  See, e.g., Catherine Rampell, Opinion, Americans—Especially but Not Exclusively Trump 
Voters—Believe Crazy, Wrong Things, WASH. POST (Dec. 28, 2016), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/rampage/wp/2016/12/28/americans-especially-but-not-exclusively-trump-vot-
ers-believe-crazy-wrong-things/. 
 42.  See Gerald G. Ashdown, Distorting Democracy: Campaign Lies in the 21st Century, 20 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1085, 1092–93 (2012) (explaining “the risk of being ‘Willie Hortoned’ 
or ‘Swift-boated’” in the absence of a response). 
 43.  See Louis A. Day, Political Advertising and the First Amendment, in POLITICAL 
COMMUNICATION 39, 41 (Robert Mann & David D. Perlmutter eds., 2011); Peter F. May, Note, 
State Regulation of Political Broadcast Advertising: Stemming the Tide of Deceptive Negative At-
tacks, 72 B.U. L. REV. 179, 179 (1992); see also Marshall, supra note 39, at 294 (“[E]ven if a 
candidate decides not to engage in similar tactics, except to ‘correct’ a misimpression created by an 
opponent, the result may be only to distract the voters from substantive issues.”). 
 44.  See Eric Boehlert, The Media’s Final Email Flop, A Fitting End to Journalism’s Troubled 
Campaign Season, MEDIA MATTERS FOR AM. (Nov. 7, 2016, 11:59 AM), http://mediamat-
ters.org/blog/2016/11/07/media-s-final-email-flop-fitting-end-journalism-s-troubled-campaign-
season/214357. 
 45.  See Ashdown, supra note 42, at 1092 (“If [voters] are told lies about issues and candidates, 
these decisions [about what is best for them and the country] get skewed.”). 
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may become so cynical and distrustful toward the electoral process46 that they 
essentially tune out campaign speech regardless of its value.47  In many in-
stances, they may become so discouraged that they refuse to vote.48  Such 
alienation may also dampen broader behaviors thought essential to self-gov-
ernment, from participation in local government to keeping informed on im-
portant public issues.49  Of particular concern is the immeasurable but corro-
sive effect that an atmosphere of noxious political discourse may have on the 
caliber of public officials.  Awareness that their character and positions may 
be subjected to harsh distortion has doubtless deterred many highly qualified 
individuals from assuming the already daunting burdens of pursuing office.50 
Given these costs, it is not surprising that some observers have endorsed 
restrictions on false political campaign speech.51  Indeed, one commentator 
has advocated that these laws sanction materially false campaign advertising 
that is made with negligence52 rather than actual malice as typically found in 
                                                          
 46.  See Michael Kimmel, A Proposal to Strengthen the Right of Response to Negative Cam-
paign Commercials, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 89, 90 (1999). 
 47.  See Goldman, supra note 37, at 896 (“In a USA TODAY/Gallup Poll, seven out of ten 
persons ‘said they believed “not much” or “nothing at all” of what they heard in political ads.’” 
(quoting Susan Page, Nasty Ads Close Out a Mud-Caked Campaign, USA TODAY, Nov. 2, 2006, at 
11A)). 
 48.  See id.; Hannah Griffin, Keep It Clean? How Negative Campaigns Affect Voter Turnout, 
17 RES PUBLICA—J. UNDERGRADUATE RES., no. 1, 2012, at 1, https://digitalcom-
mons.iwu.edu/respublica/vol17/iss1/6/. 
 49.  See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, For ‘Millennials,’ a Tide of Cynicism and a Partisan Gap, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/30/us/politics/for-millennial-voters-a-
tide-of-cynicism-toward-politics.html; see also Ashdown, supra note 42, at 1094 (“If the heart of 
free speech is to foster participation in the making of policy choices in a self-governing system, then 
something is terribly misguided when the process actually discourages such involvement and en-
gagement.” (footnote omitted)). 
 50.  See Goldman, supra note 37, at 896 (“The level of discourse and disrespect for politicians 
also discourages qualified candidates from seeking office.”). 
 51.  E.g., id. at 914–15; Marshall, supra note 39, at 294; Michelle Roberts, Ask Me No Ques-
tions and I’ll Tell You No Lies: The First Amendment and Falsehoods in Ballot Question Cam-
paigns, 33 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 37, 40 (2013); Williams, supra note 35, at 341 (“Accurate infor-
mation about legislation and candidates is essential for intelligent, rational lawmaking and voting.”).  
It is worth noting that Professor Marshall’s argument, while elegant and thorough, rests heavily on 
an extrapolation of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), up-
holding a federal law restricting corporate political campaign expenditures.  See Marshall, supra 
note 39, at 300–22.  Whatever force this logic may have is severely undercut by the Court’s over-
turning this ruling in Citizens United v. FEC,  558 U.S. 310, 365–66 (2010) (overruling portion of 
McConnell upholding restrictions on corporate independent expenditures). 
 52.  Goldman, supra note 37, at 914–15. 
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state statutes.53  The existence of such laws signals sympathy with the posi-
tion of these scholars; a recent canvass determined that at least eighteen states 
penalize false political speech.54 
Nor is this view without some foundation in opinions by the Court.  In 
Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee,55 the Court de-
clared that “[a] State indisputably has a compelling interest in preserving the 
integrity of its election process.”56  More to the point, the Court, in weighing 
a regulation of campaign literature in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commis-
sion,57 recognized that “false statements [in election materials], if credited, 
may have serious adverse consequences for the public at large.”58  In even 
stronger terms, the Court in Brown v. Hartlage59 recognized “the state interest 
in protecting the political process from distortions caused by untrue and in-
accurate speech.”60  Such pronouncements might be viewed as signaling am-
ple latitude by states to sanction candidates’ false speech.  At the same time, 
however, the Court in each case ultimately struck down the campaign regu-
lation at issue.61  This disjunction intimates the broader criticism of bans on 
false campaign speech discussed below. 
2.  Infringement of Core First Amendment Values 
The fundamental objection to prohibition of false campaign speech is 
obvious and powerful: It constitutes a content-based restriction on expression 
at the apex of First Amendment protection.  The Supreme Court’s rulings 
have consistently reflected Alexander Meiklejohn’s thesis that unhindered 
political speech is essential to self-government and therefore lies at the heart 
of the First Amendment.62  Thus, the Court has time and again acknowledged 
                                                          
 53.  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-13-109 (West 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.271 
(West 2015). 
 54.  Margaret H. Zhang, Note, Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus and the (Bleak) Future of 
Statutes That Ban False Statements in Political Campaigns, 164 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 19, 20 & 
n.8 (2015). 
 55.  489 U.S. 214 (1989). 
 56.  Id. at 231 (citing Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 761 (1973)). 
 57.  514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
 58.  Id. at 349. 
 59.  456 U.S. 45 (1982). 
 60.  Id. at 61. 
 61.  McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 349–51 (striking down ban on disseminating anonymous campaign 
literature); Eu, 489 U.S. at 222–29 (invalidating ban on endorsements of candidates in primary con-
tests by state political parties); Brown, 456 U.S. at 61–62 (overturning enforcement of ban on can-
didates’ factual misstatements where candidate’s statement was made in good faith and swiftly dis-
avowed upon realization of his error). 
 62.  See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 65–66, 69–70 (1948); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 75 (1960) (The main purpose of the First Amendment 
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the privileged place of political expression in the hierarchy of First Amend-
ment freedoms,63 and has particularly emphasized the crucial place of speech 
about political candidates.64  Accordingly, the Court has subjected re-
strictions on political expression to “exacting scrutiny.”65 
It is therefore unsurprising that the Court has struck down, for example, 
a ban on all anonymous political leafletting,66 criminal penalties for publish-
ing editorials on election day urging people to vote a certain way on issues 
on the ballot,67 a prohibition against state party central committees’ endorsing 
candidates in primary elections,68 a requirement that circulators of petitions 
                                                          
“is to give every voting member of the body politic the fullest possible participation in the under-
standing of those problems with which the citizens of a self-governing society must deal.”); see also 
OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 2–3 (1996) (Under a democratic theory of free speech, 
the law is intended “as a protection of popular sovereignty . . . to broaden the terms of public dis-
cussion as a way of enabling common citizens to become aware of the issues before them and of 
the arguments on all sides and thus to pursue their ends fully and freely.”). 
 63.  See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 329 (2010) (“[P]olitical speech . . . is cen-
tral to the meaning and purpose of the First Amendment.”); Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 
536 U.S. 765, 774 (2002) (“[Political speech] is ‘at the core of our First Amendment freedoms.’” 
(quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 861, 863 (8th Cir. 2001))); Connick v. 
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (“[S]peech on public issues occupies the ‘highest rung of the 
hierarchy of First Amendment values,’ and is entitled to special protection.” (first quoting NAACP 
v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982); then quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 
467 (1980)); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968) (“The public interest in having 
free and unhindered debate on matters of public importance [is] the core value of the Free Speech 
Clause . . . .”); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (“[T]here is practically universal agree-
ment that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental 
affairs.”); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964) (“[S]peech concerning public affairs is 
more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.”). 
 64.  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339–40 (“The First Amendment ‘has its fullest and most 
urgent application’ to speech uttered during a campaign for political office.” (quoting Eu, 489 U.S. 
at 223)).  Accord McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347; Brown, 456 U.S. at 53; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 
15 (1976) (per curiam); see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14 (“[D]ebate on the qualifications of candi-
dates [is] integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution.”). 
 65.  Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420 (1988) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45).  Accord Citizens 
United, 558 U.S. at 327 (Courts “must give the benefit of any doubt to protecting rather than stifling 
[political] speech.” (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469 (2007) (plurality 
opinion))); McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 346 (reiterating that “[t]he First Amendment affords the broadest 
protection” to “[d]iscussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates” (quoting 
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) 
(plurality opinion) (A state must show that “a facially content-based restriction on political speech 
in a public forum” is “necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to 
achieve that end.” (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 
(1983))); Brown, 456 U.S. at 53–54 (“When a State seeks to restrict directly the offer of ideas by a 
candidate to the voters, the First Amendment surely requires that the restriction be demonstrably 
supported by not only a legitimate state interest, but a compelling one, and that the restriction oper-
ate without unnecessarily circumscribing protected expression.”). 
 66.  McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347. 
 67.  Mills, 384 U.S. at 219. 
 68.  Eu, 489 U.S. at 224. 
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supporting proposed state initiatives be registered voters,69 and a verdict 
against a political candidate who falsely insinuated criminal conduct by his 
deputy sheriff opponent without verifying or investigating third-party asser-
tions.70  Only in rare instances, where a restriction clearly is narrowly tailored 
to serve a compelling interest and trenches on a modest amount of speech, 
does it survive the Court’s rigorous scrutiny.71 
Nor are proscriptions of false campaign speech exempt from this strin-
gent review.  Indeed, Charles Fried has asserted, “[i]n political campaigns the 
grossest misstatements, deceptions, and defamations are immune from legal 
sanction unless they violate private rights—that is, unless individuals are de-
famed.”72  Admittedly, the Supreme Court has not expressly affirmed this 
breadth of impunity.  Nevertheless, support for it can be found in the Court’s 
jurisprudence.  A leading—if limited—holding on this question came in 
Brown v. Hartlage.73  There, the Court held that a candidate’s presumably 
false campaign promise did not fall outside the purview of First Amendment 
protection.74 As a candidate for county commissioner, Brown had pledged to 
lower his salary if elected.75  Upon learning that his promise arguably violated 
a state anti-corruption statute, Brown retracted his statement.76  When Brown 
won the election, his opponent brought suit to have the election voided on the 
ground of Brown’s alleged violation of the statute.77  After rejecting two pos-
sible justifications for applying the statute to Brown,78 the Court focused on 
the state’s power to sanction factual misstatements.  The opinion repeatedly 
emphasized the “special vitality” of free speech during election campaigns,79 
noting the First Amendment’s promotion of an “atmosphere of free discus-
sion” in political campaigns80 and the “special force” with which the prefer-
ence for counterspeech over censorship applies in this context.81  In particu-
lar, the Court found the statute’s provision for automatic voidability of 
                                                          
 69.  Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 192 (1999). 
 70.  St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732–33 (1968). 
 71.  See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 205–06 (1992) (upholding ban on solicitation 
of votes and display of campaign materials within 100 feet of a polling place on day of election). 
 72.  Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 225, 238 (1992). 
 73.  456 U.S. 45 (1982). 
 74.  Id. at 62. 
 75.  Id. at 48. 
 76.  Id. at 48–49. 
 77.  Id. at 49. 
 78.  Id. at 54–59 (rejecting application of the statute as method of preventing vote buying); id. 
at 59–60 (rejecting application of the statute as means to curb election of independently wealthy but 
less qualified candidates). 
 79.  Id. at 53. 
 80.  Id. at 61. 
 81.  Id. 
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elections won by violators—irrespective of intent—“inconsistent” with the 
First Amendment’s extreme solicitude for campaign expression.82  Candi-
dates’ awareness that their misstatements would be subject to this strict lia-
bility would produce an intolerable “chilling effect” on their speech.83  In-
stead, latitude for error must be supplied to allow free debate the “breathing 
space” that it needs to flourish.84 
While Brown thus offers a strong measure of protection for false cam-
paign speech, the precise scope of its legacy is ambiguous.  The Court high-
lighted the absence of evidence that Brown had made the statement at issue 
“other than in good faith and without knowledge of its falsity, or that he made 
the statement with reckless disregard as to whether it was false or not,”85 
thereby substantially importing the actual malice standard for public official 
defamation plaintiffs into this setting.86  Accordingly, the opinion might be 
viewed as condoning nullification of elections where the victor is shown to 
have spoken with actual malice.  Still, the Court in Brown was not called on 
to decide whether even the actual malice standard would furnish adequate 
protection for false campaign speech.  Moreover, the Court’s tribute to the 
special value of counterspeech in political campaigns,87 accompanied by its 
observation that “a candidate’s factual blunder is unlikely to escape the notice 
of, and correction by, the erring candidate’s political opponent,”88 offers grist 
for the conclusion that nondefamatory false campaign statements lie beyond 
the reach of state regulation altogether. 
This Article argues below89 that the Court’s decision in United States v. 
Alvarez90 effectively resolved lingering questions about political candidates’ 
right to utter falsehoods in favor of the more expansive view.  It is first in-
structive, however, to review the extent to which lower courts were invali-
dating bans on false campaign speech even prior to Alvarez.  As long ago as 
1975, a federal district court panel struck down New York’s prohibition on 
the “misrepresentation of any candidate’s qualifications[,] . . . position[,] . . . 
party affiliation[,] or party endorsement” “during the course of any campaign 
for nomination or election to public office.”91 
                                                          
 82.  Id. at 61–62. 
 83.  Id. at 61. 
 84.  Id. at 60–61 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964)). 
 85.  Id. at 61. 
 86.  Cf. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80.  The Court was also troubled that Brown’s offense was 
not mitigated by his having swiftly disavowed his statement upon learning of his apparent error.  
See Brown, 456 U.S. at 61–62. 
 87.  See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 88.  Brown, 465 U.S. at 61. 
 89.  See infra Part I.B. 
 90.  567 U.S. 709 (2012). 
 91.  Vanasco v. Schwartz, 401 F. Supp. 87, 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (quoting N.Y. COMP. CODES 
R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 6201.1 (1974)), aff’d sub nom. Schwartz v. Postel, 423 U.S. 1041 (1976). 
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Faulting the statute’s lack of an actual malice requirement,92 the panel 
declared the statute overbroad.93  Twenty years later, the Washington Su-
preme Court in Rickert v. Public Disclosure Commission94 addressed a law 
forbidding persons “to sponsor with actual malice . . . [p]olitical advertising 
or an electioneering communication that contains a false statement of mate-
rial fact about a candidate for public office.”95  The court had earlier over-
turned a far broader predecessor of the statute96 because it “presupposes the 
State possesses an independent right to determine truth and falsity in political 
debate.”97  In response, the Washington legislature confined the statute’s 
reach to statements made about the candidates98 other than by the candidates 
themselves.99 
Nevertheless, the court held that this much-trimmed version of the stat-
ute also rested on the fatally flawed premise that “the government, rather than 
the people, may be the final arbiter of truth.”100  The court pointed out the 
chilling effect that the mere specter of a potentially politicized enforcement 
process might exert on campaign speech.101  Moreover, even accepting—as 
the Rickert court did not102—that the statute served a compelling state inter-
est, the exemption for false statements made about a candidate by herself or 
her supporters rendered the law underinclusive.103  The court thus concluded 
that in this area as in others, “the best remedy for false or unpleasant speech 
is more speech, not less speech.”104  A few years later, on the eve of Alvarez, 
the Eighth Circuit similarly determined that a Minnesota ban on false adver-
tising or campaign material about ballot initiatives would violate the First 
Amendment unless it could survive strict scrutiny.105 
The Sixth Circuit in Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Commission106 did up-
hold a provision of a statute that prohibited false campaign speech, but 
viewed in perspective, the decision offered little encouragement to efforts to 
                                                          
 92.  Id. at 92. 
 93.  Id. at 97. 
 94.  168 P.3d 826 (Wash. 2007). 
 95.  Id. at 828 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.530(1)(a) (2007)). 
 96.  The previous law had barred “[p]olitical advertising that contains a false statement of ma-
terial fact.”  State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d 691, 694 
(Wash. 1998) (en banc) (quoting WASH REV. CODE § 42.17.530(1)(a) (1998)). 
 97.  Id. at 695. 
 98.  Rickert, 168 P.3d at 827. 
 99.  Id. at 828. 
 100.  Id. at 827. 
 101.  See id. at 832. 
 102.  Id. at 830–31. 
 103.  Id. at 831. 
 104.  Id. at 832. 
 105.  281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 633–36 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 106.  926 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1991). 
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suppress such expression.107  Though striking down provisions authorizing 
the Ohio Elections Commission to impose fines and cease-and-desist or-
ders,108 the court permitted the commission to reprimand violators.  This of-
ficial chastisement represented a modest concession to state power compared 
to the more concrete provisions invalidated.  Indeed, it did not rely on a pe-
culiar power to regulate false expression at all.  In sustaining the reprimand 
as an exercise in “truth-declaring,”109 the court appeared to recognize this 
function as an instance of government speech exempt from the limitations of 
the First Amendment.110 
B.  Alvarez and the Elevation of Falsehood’s Constitutional Status 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s holding in Alvarez, even successful chal-
lenges to bans on false campaign speech were inhibited by the premise that 
factually false expression is not entitled to First Amendment protection.111  
Numerous assertions by the Court, at least when considered in isolation, had 
supported this proposition.112  In Alvarez, however, the Court ruled that even 
intentionally false statements—lies—do not categorically fall outside the am-
bit of free speech.113 
1.  Alvarez’s Two Routes to Invalidation 
The Court in Alvarez struck down the Stolen Valor Act114 (“SVA”) in a 
case involving a legally and morally egregious violation of the law.115  Con-
cerned that the existing ban on falsely purporting to have earned a military 
                                                          
 107.  Id. at 575. 
 108.  The court held that while the statute was constitutional on its face because false speech is 
not protected, the procedures used for its enforcement were flawed.  Id. at 578.  In a case decided 
after Alvarez, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court’s ruling that false speech does 
not lie beyond the pale of First Amendment protection had abrogated Pestrak’s holding that Ohio’s 
political false-statements laws were facially constitutional.  Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 814 
F.3d 466, 471–72 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 109.  Pestrak, 926 F.2d at 579. 
 110.  See Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 (2015) 
(“When government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining the content 
of what it says.” (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2009))). 
 111.  See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing rationales). 
 112.  See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 776 (1984) (“There is ‘no con-
stitutional value in false statements of fact.’” (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 
340 (1974))); Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983) (“[F]alse statements 
are not immunized by the First Amendment right to freedom of speech . . . .”); Herbert v. Lando, 
441 U.S. 153, 171 (1979) (“Spreading false information in and of itself carries no First Amendment 
credentials.”); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 (“[T]he erroneous statement of fact is not worthy of constitu-
tional protection . . . .”). 
 113.  United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 729–30 (2012) (plurality opinion). 
 114.  18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006). 
 115.  Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 729–30. 
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medal had proved ineffective,116  Congress attached legal penalties to this 
behavior in the Act.117  Xavier Alvarez was prosecuted under the SVA for 
introducing himself as a member of a district water board in this manner: 
“I’m a retired marine of 25 years.  I retired in the year 2001.  Back in 1987, I 
was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.  I got wounded many times 
by the same guy.”118  In fact, the entire narrative represented “a series of bi-
zarre lies.”119 
At the outset, Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion120 virtually deter-
mined the outcome by reciting the principle that content-based speech re-
strictions like the SVA were subject to “exacting scrutiny.”121  Under this 
stringent—if imprecise122—level of review, even a law serving the Act’s 
weighty purposes123 would be “presumed invalid.”124  Nor did the fact that 
the statute took aim at factual falsehoods salvage its validity.  Justice Ken-
nedy did acknowledge previous Court pronouncements affirming that the fal-
sity of speech at issue had contributed to its susceptibility to restriction.125  
He was unwilling, however, to extrapolate from these specific instances of 
proscribability a hard rule that false statements receive no First Amendment 
protection.126  On the contrary, even when considering certain types of un-
protected speech, like defamation and fraud, the Court had been “careful to 
instruct that falsity alone may not suffice to bring the speech outside the First 
Amendment.”127  Thus, three examples of falsehood cited by the govern-
                                                          
 116.  Brief for Petitioner at 6, United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (No. 11-210). 
 117.  18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2012) (“Whoever falsely represents himself or herself, verbally or in 
writing, to have been awarded any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the Armed 
Forces of the United States, any of the service medals or badges awarded to the members of such 
forces, the ribbon, button, or rosette of any such badge, decoration, or medal, or any colorable imi-
tation of such item shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than six months, or both.”). 
 118.  Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 713–14. 
 119.  United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1201 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 567 U.S. 709 (2012). 
 120.  Justice Kennedy was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg and So-
tomayor.  Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 713. 
 121.  Id. at 715. 
 122.  See Rodney A. Smolla, Categories, Tiers of Review, and the Roiling Sea of Free Speech 
Doctrine and Principle: A Methodological Critique of United States v. Alvarez, 76 ALB. L. REV. 
499, 512–13 (2013) (describing “exacting scrutiny” as “a not very clearly defined level of scru-
tiny”).  But see Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, The Voracious First Amendment: Alvarez 
and Knox in the Context of 2012 and Beyond, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 491, 496 (2013) (describing 
plurality opinion as “[a]pplying strict scrutiny” to SVA). 
 123.  See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 724. 
 124.  Id. at 717 (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004)). 
 125.  Id. at 718–19. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. at 719; see also id. at 720 (“[The federal] prohibition on false statements made to Gov-
ernment officials . . . does not lead to the broader proposition that false statements are unprotected 
when made to any person, at any time, in any context.”). 
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ment—making false statements to a public official, perjury, and misrepre-
senting oneself as an officer of the government—caused serious disruption 
of governmental functions rather than being punishable solely for their fal-
sity.128 
Accordingly, these and other restrictions on falsity approved by the 
Court did “not establish a principle that all proscriptions of false statements 
are exempt from exacting First Amendment scrutiny.”129  On the contrary, 
the plurality squarely rejected the idea that false expression “should be in a 
general category that is presumptively unprotected.”130  Acceptance of such 
a principle would amount to recognition of a new category of unprotected 
speech131 in deviation from the historical touchstone established for this 
highly limited list.  Under this approach, permissible content-based re-
strictions have generally been confined to a “few ‘historic and traditional cat-
egories [of expression] long familiar to the bar.’”132  False statements per se 
had no such pedigree.133 
Rather, only when falsity caused a “legally cognizable harm” was it sub-
ject to government proscription.134  Justice Kennedy pointed to defamation 
and fraud as notable examples where this criterion was met.135  By contrast, 
the SVA “targets falsity and nothing more.”136  Specifically, the opinion em-
phasized that the Act’s prohibition was not confined to instances where mis-
representation of military honors secured “valuable considerations”137 or 
other “material advantage[s].”138  Justice Kennedy did acknowledge the gov-
ernment’s valid interest in guarding the integrity of the military honors sys-
tem, which “serve[s] the important public function of recognizing and ex-
pressing gratitude for acts of heroism and sacrifice in military service,” and 
‘“foste[rs] morale, mission accomplishment and esprit de corps’ among ser-
vice members.”139  The SVA’s blunt ban on all false indications of having 
earned a military medal did not meet the “exacting” scrutiny to which it was 
subject. 
                                                          
 128.  Id. at 720–21. 
 129.  Id. at 720. 
 130.  Id. at 722. 
 131.  Id.  
 132.  Id. at 717 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 
(2010)). 
 133.  See id. at 722. 
 134.  Id. at 719. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. at 723. 
 138.  Id.; see id. at 714 (“[Alvarez’s false] statements do not seem to have been made to secure 
employment or financial benefits or admission to privileges reserved for those who had earned the 
Medal.”). 
 139.  Id. at 724 (quoting Brief for Petitioner, supra note 116, at 37, 38). 
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Under this level of review, the Act’s prohibition foundered on two ob-
stacles.  First, the government failed to meet its “heavy burden” of demon-
strating that false claims had diluted the public’s perception of actual award 
recipients.140  On the contrary, Justice Kennedy endorsed the assertion of the 
Veterans of Foreign Wars that “there is nothing that charlatans such as Xavier 
Alvarez can do to stain [the Medal recipients’] honor.”141  Moreover, even 
assuming that false claims had undermined the military honors system, the 
SVA’s sweeping restrictions on speech were not narrowly tailored to avert 
this harm.  Indeed, the government had not shown that suppressing speech 
was needed at all to preserve the luster of military medals.142  Invoking fa-
mous maxims by Justices Brandeis and Holmes, the plurality pointed to coun-
terspeech as the preferred remedy to false expression under the First Amend-
ment.143  Alvarez’s own lie offered a powerful illustration of the efficacy of 
this response.  Once the lie became known, the episode was reported by the 
media and Alvarez was ridiculed online.144  Moreover, a more comprehensive 
form of counterspeech was also available.  A government-created database 
listing Congressional Medal of Honor winners that is accessible to the public 
would presumably vindicate the government’s interest in preserving the in-
tegrity of the military awards system.145  Thus, in the words of two commen-
tators, the government had “less restrictive means than criminally prosecut-
ing liars” to achieve its goal.146 
Finally, transcending the details of the plurality’s analysis was concern 
with the ominous implications of government carte blanche to ban any spe-
cies of falsity.  Such authority would empower government to forbid false 
speech on a wide range of subjects and in whatever form the expression 
took—“whether shouted from the rooftops or made in a barely audible whis-
per.”147  Nor did Justice Kennedy mince words about the totalitarian potential 
                                                          
 140.  Id. at 726. 
 141.  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Brief for Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States 
et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1, Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (No. 11-210)). 
 142.  Id. at 726–27. 
 143.  Id. at 727–28 (“The remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true. . . .  (‘If there be 
time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of 
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence’).  The theory of our Con-
stitution is ‘that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the compe-
tition of the market.’” (citation omitted) (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) 
(Brandeis, J., concurring), and then quoting and citing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting))); see also Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 795 
(2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“If [a state] believes that certain sorts of candidate speech disclose 
flaws in the candidate’s credentials, democracy and free speech [rather than restrictions] are their 
own correctives.”). 
 144.  Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 727. 
 145.  Id. at 729. 
 146.  Amar & Brownstein, supra note 122, at 496–97. 
 147.  Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 723. 
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of permitting government this “broad censorial power.”148  He repudiated this 
power for its lack of a “clear limiting principle” and its resemblance to the 
dystopian system portrayed in George Orwell’s classic novel, Nineteen 
Eighty-Four.149  However “contemptible” Alvarez’s lies, the First Amend-
ment was designed to avoid the path to such a society; one of the provision’s 
costs is that “it protects the speech we detest as well as the speech we em-
brace.”150 
While Justice Breyer concurred only in the judgment,151 he was in broad 
agreement with the plurality on several points.  Like the plurality, he refused 
to interpret the Court’s past statements about falsity’s unworthiness of pro-
tection as “mean[ing] ‘no protection at all.’”152  After all, false statements can 
serve constructive purposes not only in social contexts,153 but also “in pub-
lic[,] . . . technical, philosophical, and scientific” settings.154  In addition, Jus-
tice Breyer shared the plurality’s anxiety over the capacity for abuse inherent 
in empowering government to punish expression for its sheer falsity.  In par-
ticular, he raised the prospect of government’s selectively pursuing false 
claims by disfavored groups while leaving similar claims by members with 
sympathetic views unmolested.155  Justice Breyer further echoed the plural-
ity’s caution that the very existence of this kind of power could chill deserv-
ing expression.156 
Nevertheless, Justice Breyer would not sign onto the plurality’s “strict 
categorical analysis.”157  Instead, he favored what he variously characterized 
as “intermediate scrutiny,” “‘proportionality’ review,” and “an examination 
of ‘fit.’”158  Under this approach, the Court assesses whether the law in ques-
                                                          
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. at 729–30. 
 151.  Id. at 730 (Breyer, J., concurring).  Justice Breyer’s opinion was joined by Justice Kagan.  
Id. 
 152.  Id. at 733. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id. at 734. 
 156.  Compare id. at 723 (plurality opinion) (“The mere potential for the exercise of that power 
casts . . . a chill the First Amendment cannot permit if free speech, thought, and discourse are to 
remain a foundation of our freedom.”), with id. at 733 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he threat of 
criminal prosecution for making a false statement can inhibit the speaker from making true state-
ments, thereby ‘chilling’ a kind of speech that lies at the First Amendment’s heart.”). 
 157.  Id. at 730 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 158.  Id.  Justice Breyer’s adoption of this standard has evoked skepticism from scholars.  See, 
e.g., Benjamin Pomerance, An Elastic Amendment: Justice Stephen G. Breyer’s Fluid Conceptions 
of Freedom of Speech, 79 ALB. L. REV. 403, 492 (2016) (observing that Justice Breyer “[s]pen[t] 
very little time discussing the Court’s prior history of applying strict scrutiny to content-based 
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tion “works speech-related harm that is out of proportion to its justifica-
tions.”159  The crucial consideration is whether the government could achieve 
its objective “in less burdensome ways”; here, Justice Breyer thought, it 
could.160  As Justice Alito pointed out in dissent, however, Justice Breyer’s 
sketch of this standard supplied slim guidance to legislators seeking to craft 
a permissible law advancing the SVA’s aims.161  Also left unsettled was 
whether future prohibitions of false expression would be governed by the 
concurrence’s intermediate scrutiny162 or the plurality’s more demanding 
test.163 
2.  Alvarez’s Impact 
At least with respect to false campaign expression, the precise level of 
scrutiny to be gleaned from Alvarez may make little practical difference.  
General prohibitions of false political campaign speech164 have fared poorly 
in the wake of Alvarez.  Although these rulings have reserved the theoretical 
possibility of valid legislation in this area, it seems unlikely that meaningful 
laws of this sort could actually be crafted. 
                                                          
laws”); Smolla, supra note 122, at 508 (asserting that Justice Breyer elected to apply intermediate 
scrutiny “without much real analysis or explication”). 
 159.  Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 730. 
 160.  Id. at 737. 
 161.  See id. at 744–45 (Alito, J., dissenting).  This vagueness was not Justice Alito’s principal 
critique of the decision.  Citing the Court’s past declarations that false statements of fact do not 
warrant constitutional protection, id. at 746–48, Justice Alito argued that the lies covered by the 
SVA could be banned because they had no value.  Id. at 749–50.  Conversely, these lies harmed 
both the nation’s “system of military honors” and “medal recipients and their families.”  Id. at 739.  
Analogizing to trademark law, Justice Alito reasoned that “the proliferation of false claims about 
military awards blurs the signal given out by the actual awards by making them seem more common 
than they really are, and this diluting effect harms the military by hampering its efforts to foster 
morale and esprit de corps.”  Id. at 743–44.  Thus, Alvarez could be punished for his “misappropri-
ation” of the Medal of Honor.  Id. at 754. 
 162.  See People v. Morera-Munoz, 210 Cal. Rptr. 3d 409, 419–20 (Ct. App. 2016). 
 163.  See O’Neill v. Crawford, 132 Ohio St. 3d 1472 (Ohio 2012) (decision referenced in the 
North Eastern Reporter, 970 N.E.2d 973). 
 164.  Laws targeted at specific campaign abuses causing demonstrable harms could present a 
different case.  Compare Richard L. Hasen, A Constitutional Right to Lie in Campaigns and Elec-
tions?, 74 MONT. L. REV. 53, 75 (2013) (arguing that after Alvarez, “interests supporting false cam-
paign speech laws . . . [are] unlikely to trump the courts’ concerns about censorship and partisan 
manipulation of these processes in speech at the core of the First Amendment”), and Staci Lieffring, 
Note, First Amendment and the Right to Lie: Regulating Knowingly False Campaign Speech After 
United States v. Alvarez, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1047, 1061 (2013) (arguing that after Alvarez, “[i]t 
seems likely that the Court would strike down any attempt to regulate false, non-defamatory cam-
paign speech”), with Hasen, supra, at 57, 69–77 (asserting that Alvarez permits bans on false elec-
tion speech about the “mechanics of voting” such as when to vote where defendant is shown by 
clear and convincing evidence to have acted with actual malice), and Lieffring, supra, at 1078 
(“Laws aimed at preventing false information about voter eligibility, polling places or election dates 
and times . . . would be deemed constitutional.”). 
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As noted earlier, Alvarez added potency to the hostility toward bans on 
false political165 campaign speech displayed by lower courts even before the 
Court’s decision.166  In Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,167 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit struck down an Ohio law barring 
persons from disseminating false information about a political candidate 
“knowing the same to be false or with reckless disregard of whether it was 
false or not, if the statement is designed to promote the election, nomination, 
or defeat of the candidate.”168  The court’s analysis began by acknowledging 
that Alvarez had abrogated the court’s earlier holding in Pestrak v. Ohio Elec-
tions Commission.169  It ended by noting that other courts encountering sim-
ilar laws since Alvarez had likewise found them invalid.170  With Alvarez 
having erased the fallacy that false speech is invisible to the First Amend-
ment, the principle that restrictions on political speech are subject to strict 
scrutiny applied.171  Here, the state had failed to demonstrate that its ban was 
narrowly tailored to protect its concededly compelling interest in protecting 
the integrity of its elections.172  Rather the law forbade far too much speech 
and reached too many speakers, left untouched considerable damage to the 
interest it sought to serve, and was enforced by machinery fraught with po-
tential for obstruction and mischief.173 
In 281 Care Committee v. Arneson,174 the Eighth Circuit similarly re-
jected a Minnesota law that barred persons from 
participat[ing] in the preparation, dissemination, or broadcast of 
paid political advertising or campaign material . . . with respect to 
the effect of a ballot question, that is designed or tends to . . . pro-
mote or defeat a ballot question, that is false, and that the person 
knows is false or communicates to others with reckless disregard 
of whether it is false.175 
                                                          
 165.  Restrictions on judicial campaign speech are discussed infra Part II. 
 166.  See supra notes 89–110 and accompanying text. 
 167.  814 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 168.  Id. at 469–70 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE § 3517.21(B)(10)). 
 169.  See id. at 471–72 (citing Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 926 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1991)).  
Pestrak is discussed supra, at notes 106–110 and accompanying text.  The district court had made 
Alvarez the centerpiece of its analysis in its own invalidation of Ohio’s statute.  See List v. Ohio 
Elections Comm’n, 45 F. Supp. 3d 765, 778 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (“The response to the unreasoned is 
the rational; to the uninformed, the enlightened; to the straight-out lie, the simple truth.” (quoting 
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 727 (2012), (plurality opinion) (emphasis omitted)), aff’d 
sub nom. Driehaus, 814 F.3d 466. 
 170.  Driehaus, 814 F.3d at 476. 
 171.  Id. at 473. 
 172.  Id. at 473–74. 
 173.  Id. at 474–75. 
 174.  766 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 175.  Id. at 778 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting MINN. STAT. § 211B.06(1)). 
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More explicitly than in Driehaus, the Eighth Circuit characterized Alva-
rez as a doctrinal requisite for strict scrutiny rather than its source.  The court 
noted that, while Alvarez “guides our analysis,” it was the Supreme Court’s 
proclamations on the protection of political speech that determined the level 
of scrutiny in this instance.176  Even if Justice Breyer’s application of inter-
mediate scrutiny to the SVA was controlling in Alvarez, the court reasoned, 
Justice Breyer himself had indicated that a ban on false political speech 
would call for more stringent review.177  At any rate, Minnesota’s ban could 
not survive this harsh glare, for the statute was not narrowly tailored to attain 
the state’s (presumed) compelling “interest in preserving ‘fair and honest’ 
elections and preventing a ‘fraud upon the electorate.’”178  Rather, the law 
suffered from multiple flaws.  It was not necessary to the state’s achievement 
of its purpose,179 it was both overbroad180 and underinclusive,181 the law’s 
potential for abuse could deter protected speech,182 and a means less restric-
tive of speech—viz., counterspeech—was available to accomplish its 
goals.183  In other instances as well, courts since Alvarez have ruled bans on 
false campaign speech insufficiently tailored to their aim of protecting the 
integrity of elections.184 
3.  Alvarez in Context 
Decisions like Driehaus and 281 Care Committee can be viewed as re-
flecting more than special solicitude for political speech; they are also con-
sistent with a broader hostility toward content-based restrictions displayed by 
the Supreme Court throughout this decade.  This attitude has been especially 
evident in the Court’s protection of speech widely considered to be of little 
or no value and repugnant to many.185  In United States v. Stevens,186 the 
                                                          
 176.  Id. at 784. 
 177.  See id. at 783–84. 
 178.  Id. at 787. 
 179.  Id. at 788–91. 
 180.  Id. at 791–92. 
 181.  Id. at 794–95. 
 182.  Id. at 794. 
 183.  Id. at 793–94. 
 184.  See, e.g., Serafine v. Branaman, 810 F.3d 354, 361–62 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Alvarez to 
support conclusion that counterspeech is prescribed remedy for misleading speech); Common-
wealth v. Lucas, 34 N.E.3d 1242, 1251–57 (Mass. 2015) (applying strict scrutiny under Massachu-
setts Declaration of Rights to invalidate state statute criminalizing certain false statements about 
political candidates and questions submitted to voters); Magda v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 58 
N.E.3d 1188, 1205 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016). 
 185.  See generally John D. Moore, The Closed and Shrinking Frontier of Unprotected Speech, 
36 WHITTIER L. REV. 1 (2014) (charting the erosion of categorically unprotected speech). 
 186.  559 U.S. 460 (2010). 
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Court set the tone for a newly vigorous enforcement of its longstanding187 
suspicion of restrictions aimed at particular content.  There, the Court over-
turned a conviction for selling videos of dogfighting under a federal ban on 
depictions of animal cruelty that the Court held facially invalid.188  The Court 
rejected in strong terms the government’s contention that this category of 
expression should be added to the roster of unprotected speech because its 
costs outweigh its value.189  For the Court, this approach amounted to “a free-
floating test for First Amendment coverage” that was “startling and danger-
ous.”190 
In the term between Stevens and Alvarez, the Court reaffirmed that un-
popularity, presumably meager worth, and even putative harm would not 
overcome the First Amendment’s aversion to restrictions aimed at specified 
content.  In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association,191 the Court 
struck down a California statute barring the sale or rental of “violent video 
games” to minors and requiring their packaging to be labeled “18.”192  The 
result was essentially preordained when Justice Scalia declared that the case 
would be governed by Stevens’s resistance to recognizing new categories of 
unprotected speech absent a compelling showing of historical sanction.193  
California contended that engagement with violent video games promoted 
aggression in juveniles in a way that exposure to traditional media did not, 
because the player “participates in the violent action on screen and deter-
mines its outcome.”194  Much like the plurality in Alvarez a year later, how-
ever, the Court found the government’s evidence of a causal link between the 
forbidden speech and alleged harm inadequate to survive the strict scrutiny 
that prohibition of content required.195 
The holding in Brown was in the spirit of—though not expressly reliant 
on—the Court’s decision a few months earlier in Snyder v. Phelps.196  There, 
the defendants had been held liable for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress for picketing the funeral of a soldier killed in the line of duty; their signs 
had asserted that deaths of American soldiers and other calamities reflected 
                                                          
 187.  See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“Content-based regulations 
are presumptively invalid.” (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims 
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115 (1991))); Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove all else, 
the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its 
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”). 
 188.  Stevens, 559 U.S. at 464–67, 482. 
 189.  Id. at 469–70. 
 190.  Id. at 470. 
 191.  564 U.S. 786 (2011). 
 192.  Id. at 789, 802–05. 
 193.  See id. at 791–93. 
 194.  Id. at 798. 
 195.  See id. at 799–801. 
 196.  562 U.S. 443 (2011). 
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God’s wrath for the nation’s tolerance of homosexuality, particularly in the 
military.197  By almost any ordinary reckoning, the sentiments expressed 
would be considered offensive if not odious,198 and the Court intimated a low 
regard for the pickets’ value.199  Nevertheless, the Court vacated the damages 
award, finding that the distress complained of “turned on the content and 
viewpoint of the message conveyed.”200  Under the First Amendment’s man-
date “to protect even hurtful speech on public issues,” the defendants could 
not be punished for the pain their speech inflicted on the decedent’s family.201 
More recently, the Court placed content-based restrictions in even fur-
ther peril in Reed v. Town of Gilbert.202  In Reed, the Court struck down Gil-
bert’s sign code as a content-based regulation of speech.203  The code had 
imposed disparate restrictions on size, location, and times of display for three 
relevant categories of signs.204  Most striking about the decision was not its 
outcome,205 but rather the Court’s description of content-based speech regu-
lation as “a law applie[d] to particular speech because of the topic discussed 
or the idea or message expressed.”206  On its face, this criterion appears to 
collapse the distinction between content regulation and subject-matter regu-
lation.207  Even if Reed did not have that drastic of an impact,208 however, the 
Court unequivocally reaffirmed that restrictions deemed content-based 
would draw strict scrutiny.209  There can be little doubt that bans on false 
campaign speech fall into this category. 
                                                          
 197.  Id. at 448–51. 
 198.  See id. at 448 (noting that signs stated, inter alia, “Thank God for 9/11,” “Thank God for 
Dead Soldiers,” and “God Hates Fags”). 
 199.  See id. at 460 (“[The defendants’] funeral picketing is certainly hurtful and its contribution 
to public discourse may be negligible.”); see also United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 714 (2012) 
(plurality opinion) (describing protests in Snyder as “hateful”). 
 200.  Snyder, 562 U.S. at 457, 459. 
 201.  Id. at 460–61. 
 202.  135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). 
 203.  Id. at 2224. 
 204.  Id. at 2224–25 (describing requirements for “Ideological Sign[s],” “Political Sign[s],” and 
“Temporary Directional Signs” (alterations in original)). 
 205.  The Court voted unanimously to invalidate the code.  Id. at 2223.  Three Justices—Ken-
nedy, Alito, and Sotomayor—signed onto an opinion concurring with Justice Thomas’s majority 
opinion, while three others—Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan—concurred only in the judgment.  Id. 
 206.  Id. at 2227. 
 207.  See Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411, 412 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that “Reed 
effectively abolishes any distinction between content regulation and subject-matter regulation”); 
Cahaly v. Larosa, 796 F.3d 399, 405 (4th Cir. 2015); Andrew Koppelman, A Free Speech Response 
to the Gay Rights/Religious Liberty Conflict, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1125, 1133–34 (2016). 
 208.  Note, Free Speech Doctrine After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1981, 2000 
(2016) (“To the extent that lower court reception of Reed is beginning to define a doctrinal equilib-
rium, Reed’s impact has been narrow.”). 
 209.  See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2231; see also id. at 2233 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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II.  THE IMPACT OF REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA V. WHITE ON 
JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN RESTRICTIONS 
The broad immunity extended to false political campaign speech did not 
automatically translate to comparable protection for false judicial campaign 
expression.  Indeed, decades of restrictions on judicial candidates’ ability to 
make a range of statements assumed decisive differences between political 
and judicial campaign speech under the First Amendment.  In 2002, however, 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White210 up-
ended this premise by subjecting the restriction at issue there to strict scru-
tiny.211  Since then, lower courts have invoked White to invalidate restraints 
on judicial candidates’ speech besides the one struck down in that case.212 
A.  Judicial Campaign Speech Codes: The Attempted Separation of 
Elections and Politics 
An overwhelming majority of the nation’s state judges must run the 
gauntlet of popular election.  Citizens’ votes determine the selection or reten-
tion of judges in thirty-nine states.213  According to a frequently cited tally, 
about eighty-seven percent of state judges stand for election at least once to 
attain or hold their office.214  These figures contrast starkly with the appoint-
ment215 and lifetime tenure216 of federal judges.  Through these arrangements, 
the Framers sought to preserve judicial independence in the face of majori-
tarian pressures.217  Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, however, the 
                                                          
 210.  536 U.S. 765 (2002).  The case is discussed infra Part II.B. 
 211.  Id. at 774, 781. 
 212.  See infra Part II.C. 
 213.  See AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES: APPELLATE AND 
GENERAL JURISDICTION COURTS (2013), http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/Judi-
cial_Selection_Charts_1196376173077.pdf. 
 214.  Robert C. Berness, Note, Norms of Judicial Behavior: Understanding Restrictions on Ju-
dicial Candidate Speech in the Age of Attack Politics, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 1027, 1028 (2001); see 
also Rachel Caufield, Judicial Elections: Today’s Trends and Tomorrow’s Forecast, 46 JUDGES’ J. 
6, 6 (2007) (“Among state trial courts, 76 percent of judges are elected to their initial term, and 88 
percent face the voters for subsequent terms on the bench.  For state appellate courts, 53 percent of 
judges are elected to their initial term on the bench, and 89 percent face the voters for subsequent 
terms on the bench.”). 
 215.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing for appointment by the President with advice and 
consent of the Senate). 
 216.  Id. art. III, § 1 (providing that judges shall hold office “during good Behaviour”). 
 217.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009); see also Mi-
chael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to That Man Behind the Robe: Judicial Elections, the First 
Amendment, and Judges as Politicians, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 301, 306 (2003) (“The protection 
of judicial independence is . . . perhaps the foundational principle . . . of Article III.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
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appeal of democratic accountability influenced the widespread adoption of 
direct election of state judges.218 
In time, sentiment arose that allowing judicial candidates to conduct 
their campaigns in the same manner as their political counterparts posed dan-
gers to the distinctive function and character of the judiciary.219  Campaign 
expression and activity deemed appropriate for aspirants to a legislative or 
elective office could undermine judicial candidates’ capacity to act as fair 
and impartial arbiters of the law once in office.220  For example, commitments 
to adhere to specific positions are the lifeblood of traditional political cam-
paigning.  For judicial candidates, however, such commitments are said to 
undermine the impartial consideration of evidence and arguments expected 
of judges.221  Regardless of their actual effect on judges’ behavior, moreover, 
these commitments are viewed as impairing public respect for the judiciary 
by fostering the perception of judicial candidates as mere politicians.222 
These kinds of concerns came to be embodied in limitations on the 
speech and political activities of judicial candidates.  A milestone was the 
provision of the 1972 American Bar Association (“ABA”) Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct223 stating that a candidate for judicial office “should not 
make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and 
                                                          
 218.  See EVAN HAYNES, THE SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES 80–135 (1944). 
 219.  See Gerald Stern, The Changing Face of Judicial Elections, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1507, 
1509 (2004) (“The argument in support of the restrictions [on judicial campaign speech] is that, 
unlike other public officials, judges play a unique role in deciding issues of fact and law, based on 
principles of established law.  They are not the public’s representatives in the political sense.”). 
 220.  Shira J. Goodman et al., What’s More Important: Electing Judges or Judicial Independ-
ence?  It’s Time for Pennsylvania to Choose Judicial Independence, 48 DUQ. L. REV. 859, 862 
(2010); see Ofer Raban, Judicial Impartiality and the Regulation of Judicial Election Campaigns, 
15 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 205, 214 (2004) (“Opinions which electioneering legislators are free 
to express and then to try to act upon may be totally out of bounds for elected judges and a threat to 
their duties of office.”). 
 221.  See Stephen Gillers, “If Elected, I Promise [_____]”—What Should Judicial Candidates 
Be Allowed to Say?, 35 IND. L. REV. 725, 726 (2002) (describing commitments by judicial candi-
dates as “the antithesis of the judicial process”); see also Megan Sloane Gordon & Matthew Edward 
Wetzel, The Precarious Balance of Judicial Candidate Speech and Judicial Ethics: The Announce 
Clause in the Aftermath of Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 613, 
618 (2003) (arguing that campaign promises “are completely antithetical to the ideas of neutrality, 
unbiasedness, and cold impartiality that inhere to the judiciary”). 
 222.  See Lloyd B. Snyder, The Constitutionality and Consequences of Restrictions on Cam-
paign Speech by Candidates for Judicial Office, 35 UCLA L. REV. 207, 214 (1987); see also Morial 
v. Judiciary Comm’n, 565 F.2d 295, 302 (5th Cir. 1977) (describing limitations on judicial candi-
dates’ speech as advancing “[t]he state’s interest in ensuring that judges be and appear to be neither 
antagonistic nor beholden to any interest, party, or person”); Adam R. Long, Note, Keeping Mud 
Off the Bench: The First Amendment and Regulation of Candidates’ False or Misleading Statements 
in Judicial Elections, 51 DUKE L.J. 787, 790 (2001) (“If the citizenry sees judges as politicians 
first . . . the public will question the validity and legitimacy of judicial decisions and, in fact, the 
judiciary as a whole.”). 
 223.  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1972). 
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impartial performance of the duties of the office; announce his views on dis-
puted legal or political issues; or misrepresent his identity, qualifications, 
present position, or other fact.”224  By the time the Supreme Court issued its 
decision in White, states with elected judges had widely enacted campaign 
codes containing variations of these restraints.225  The restrictions were justi-
fied as balancing due process’s imperative of judicial impartiality with the 
interest in democratic accountability and protection of free speech.226 
For many, however, speech restrictions are an imperfect solution to a 
more fundamental problem: the very existence of an elected judiciary.227  The 
responsiveness to voters expected of legislators and executives is said to be 
incompatible with judges’ duty to uphold the rights of unpopular groups and 
individuals.228  Substantial evidence exists to support Justice O’Connor’s ob-
servation that “[e]lected judges cannot help being aware that if the public is 
not satisfied with the outcome of a particular case, it could hurt their reelec-
tion prospects.”229  Another criticism is that voters are poorly positioned to 
                                                          
 224.  Id. Canon 7(B)(1)(c).  The Code also imposed restraints on fundraising and involvement 
with political organizations.  Id. Canon 7(A)(1). 
 225.  See Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 880 nn.21–22 (8th Cir. 2001), rev’d 
on other grounds sub nom. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
 226.  See, e.g., Jason Miles Levien & Stacie L. Fatka, Cleaning Up Judicial Elections: Examin-
ing the First Amendment Limitations on Judicial Campaign Regulation, 2 MICH. L. & POL’Y REV. 
71, 84–88 (1997); Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics, 
9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1059, 1060 (1996).  See generally Ferris K. Nesheiwat, Judicial Restraint: 
Resolving the Constitutional Tension Between First Amendment Protection of Political Speech and 
the Compelling Interest in Preserving Judicial Integrity During Judicial Elections, 24 QUINNIPIAC 
L. REV. 757 (2006). 
 227.  See generally Martin H. Redish & Jennifer Aronoff, The Real Constitutional Problem with 
State Judicial Selection: Due Process, Judicial Retention, and the Dangers of Popular Constitu-
tionalism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2014) (arguing against all forms of judicial elections). 
 228.  See White, 536 U.S. at 798 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is the business of legislators and 
executives to be popular.  But in litigation, issues of law or fact should not be determined by popular 
vote; it is the business of judges to be indifferent to unpopularity.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Comment, 
Evaluating Judicial Candidates, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1985, 1988 (1988) (“The paramount function 
of courts is to protect social minorities and individual rights.  But judges cannot be expected to 
perform this countermajoritarian function if their ability to keep their prestigious, highly sought 
after positions depends on popular approval of their rulings.”); Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian 
Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 694 (1995); Charles 
Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 51 (2003); David E. Pozen, The 
Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 284 (2008); Gerald F. Uelmen, Crocodiles in 
the Bathtub: Maintaining the Independence of State Supreme Courts in the Era of Judicial Politici-
zation, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133, 1133 (1997) (comparing the situation of a judge deciding 
controversial cases while facing reelection to “finding a crocodile in your bathtub” in that “it’s hard 
to think about much else while you’re shaving”); see also Raban, supra note 220, at 214 (offering 
examples of statements that judges might make that might be popular but which would threaten the 
integrity of the legal system). 
 229.  White, 536 U.S. at 789 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. 
Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election 
in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 759, 793–94 (1995) (contrasting the rate of overriding a jury 
recommendation of life without parole and imposing the death penalty by judges subject to election 
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evaluate the credentials of judicial candidates.230  In a similar vein, it is ar-
gued that qualities that make for an effective campaigner largely differ from 
those needed of good judges.231 
Moreover, scholars worry that campaign contributions to judicial can-
didates may compromise their independence and impartiality when they as-
cend to the bench.  Critics perceive an unvirtuous cycle in which judicial 
candidates solicit contributions from individuals and organizations who in 
turn expect favorable rulings from the judges they helped elect.232  Justice 
O’Connor expressed this concern as well, further asserting that even “the 
mere possibility that judges’ decisions may be motivated by the desire to re-
pay campaign contributors is likely to undermine the public’s confidence in 
the judiciary.”233  Substantial data exist to support the inference that the op-
eration of this dynamic extends well beyond possibility to apparent reality.234  
                                                          
with the much greater incidence of overriding a jury recommendation of death in a state where 
judges did not stand for election); Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and 
Coercion: Is Justice Blind When It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 258 (2004) (finding 
an increase in sentences handed down by judges as reelection approaches); Joanna M. Shepherd, 
Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 648 (2009); CHRIS W. BONNEAU, 
FEDERALIST SOC’Y, A SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE CONCERNING JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 7 
(2012), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/publications/a-survey-of-empirical-evidence-concerning-
judicial-elections (“[T]he evidence is pretty clear . . . that elected judges are responsive to their con-
stituencies when it comes time to make decisions on the bench.”). 
 230.  See Richard A. Posner, Lecture, Judicial Autonomy in a Political Environment, 38 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 1, 5 (2006) (“It is completely unrealistic to think that the average voter will ever know 
enough about judicial performance to be able to evaluate judicial candidates intelligently.”); Pozen, 
supra note 228, at 293. 
 231.  See Douglas D. Birk, Stuck Inside of Minnesota Without Judicial Election Reform Again: 
A Contemporary Survey of the Political Movement to Preserve Judicial Impartiality from the Min-
nesota Judiciary’s Point of View, 32 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 507, 541 (2011) (ascribing to a 
district judge the identification of the paradox of “selecting judges by the same process as is used 
for other public candidates while expecting distinctly different qualities and attributes in judicial 
candidates”); Marie A. Failinger, Can a Good Judge Be a Good Politician? Judicial Elections from 
a Virtue Ethics Approach, 70 MO. L. REV. 433, 434 (2005); Laura Denvir Stith & Jeremy Root, The 
Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan: The Least Political Method of Selecting High Quality Judges, 
74 MO. L. REV. 711, 747 (2009); Nathan Richard Wildermann, Note, Bought Elections: Republican 
Party of Minnesota v. White, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 765, 788 (2003). 
 232.  See, e.g., David Barnhizer, “On the Make”: Campaign Funding and the Corrupting of the 
American Judiciary, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 361, 364–66 (2001); Roy A. Schotland, Financing Judi-
cial Elections, 2000: Change and Challenge, 3 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C. L. 849, 852–57 (2001); 
Penny J. White, Preserving the Legacy: A Tribute to Chief Justice Harry L. Carrico, One Who 
Exalted Judicial Independence, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 615, 669–72 (2004). 
 233.  White, 536 U.S. at 790 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 234.  See, e.g., Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An Em-
pirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 73 
(2011) (compiling data indicating that in partisan judicial elections, a positive correlation exists 
between the amount of contributions received by a successful candidate and the probability that that 
judge will vote in favor of business interests); Shepherd, supra note 229, at 669 (“[Empirical evi-
dence] shows that for judges elected in partisan elections, contributions from various interest groups 
have a statistically significant relationship with the probability that judges vote for litigants that the 
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Further, the scale of contributions—already a source of public attention when 
Justice O’Connor decried its impact235—has only skyrocketed since then.236  
This trajectory has been largely fueled by the Supreme Court’s 2010 ruling 
in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,237 which found that cor-
porate independent campaign expenditures in elections constitute political 
speech protected by the First Amendment.238 
Commentators also lament that the sharp increase in spending on judi-
cial elections has been accompanied by deterioration in their tone; in the 
words of Roy Schotland, they have become “nastier, noisier, and costlier.”239  
Attack ads, long a key tactic in political contests, have played an increasingly 
prominent part in judicial races.240  A few examples from recent elections 
illustrate the edge exhibited by such ads.241 
                                                          
interest groups favor.”); Keith Swisher, Pro-Prosecution Judges: “Tough on Crime,” Soft on Strat-
egy, Ripe for Disqualification, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 317, 369 (2010) (discussing a study in which “[o]n 
average . . . justices ruled in favor of [their] contributors 70 percent of the time”).  But see James 
Bopp, Jr. & Anita Y. Woudenberg, Extreme Facts, Extraordinary Case: The Sui Generis Recusal 
Test of Caperton v. Massey, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 305, 315 (2010) (finding the evidence of cam-
paign contributions’ influence on judicial decisions “weak[]”). 
 235.  See, e.g., Sheila Kaplan, The Very Best Judges That Money Can Buy, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP. (Nov. 29, 1999). 
 236.  See Steele Trotter, Williams-Yulee and the Changing Landscape of Judicial Campaigns, 
28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 947, 947 (2015) (noting the dramatic increase in judicial campaign con-
tributions during the 2000s). 
 237.  558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 238.  Id. at 339–44.  See Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 
1, 30 (2012) (“[I]ndependent expenditures offer a political benefit to candidates that serve as the 
quids in a quid pro quo exchange nearly as well as a contribution.  When those independent expend-
itures can be made without restriction in very large amounts, the risk of corruption may even be 
greater than the risk from capped contributions.”). 
 239.  Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1081 
(2007); see also David W. Earley, When Bathtub Crocodiles Attack: The Timing and Propriety of 
Campaigning by Judicial Retention Election Candidates, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 239, 252 
(2012) (observing the influence of ugly partisan politics on judicial elections); Jed Handelsman 
Shugerman, The Twist of Long Terms: Judicial Elections, Role Fidelity, and American Tort Law, 
98 GEO. L.J. 1349, 1351 (2010); Scott Michels, Judicial Elections Turn ‘Bitter, Nasty’ and Pricey, 
abcNEWS (June 19, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=3292991&page=1. 
 240.  See Anthony Champagne, Television Ads in Judicial Campaigns, 35 IND. L. REV. 669, 673 
(2002) (concluding from studies of judicial elections in four states that candidates’ ads “highlight 
easily absorbed negative messages about the opponent” (quoting STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE ET AL., 
THE MEDIA GAME: AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE TELEVISION AGE 100 (1993)); Melinda Gann Hall, 
Partisanship, Interest Groups, and Attack Advertising in the Post-White Era, or Why Nonpartisan 
Judicial Elections Really Do Stink, 31 J.L. & POL. 429, 435–40 (2016).  An early, classic instance 
of the effective use of such ads was the successful 1986 campaign to remove three justices from the 
California Supreme Court.  See Robert S. Thompson, Judicial Retention Elections and Judicial 
Method: A Retrospective on the California Retention Election of 1986, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2007, 
2038 (1988) (describing the campaign as “a blatant appeal to emotion and desire for revenge”). 
 241.  E.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Judge Candidate Gets Law License Suspension for Attack Ads; 
Dissenters Cite Free-Speech Protection, A.B.A. J. (Dec. 9, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://www.abajour-
nal.com/news/article/judicial_candidate_gets_law_license_suspension_for_attack_ads_dissent-
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An obvious alternative to the perceived ills of judicial elections would 
be emulation of the federal system of appointment.  Indeed, some commen-
tators have argued that judicial elections inevitably violate due process.242  
Barring such an unlikely ruling, however, problems posed by an elected ju-
diciary must likely be addressed through reform rather than abolition.  What-
ever the deficiencies of judicial elections, they remain highly popular with 
the public.  Voters across the nation have routinely and decisively rejected 
efforts to remove the selection of judges from their hands.243  In particular, 
efforts to balance the presumed advantages of appointment with democratic 
accountability through the “Missouri Plan”244 have failed to gain traction.  
Under this system—also known as merit selection245—a judge is selected by 
a high elected official from a list compiled by a nonpartisan nominating com-
mission and then is subject to later unopposed retention elections in which 
voters decide whether to retain the judge.246  A number of states besides Mis-
souri have adopted this approach at least in part.247  On the whole, however, 
voters have overwhelmingly rejected attempts to introduce this limitation on 
their ability to choose judges.248  Indeed, recent years have been marked by 
efforts to modify or dismantle merit selection where it already exists.249 
                                                          
ers_se (An ad run in 2014 “showed a robed, faceless judge pouring Jack Daniels whiskey and serv-
ing it to children.  The voiceover said: ‘Everyone knows that a judge would never serve alcohol to 
kids in a courtroom.  But appellate judge Tim Cannon did something almost as bad.’”); Richard L. 
Hasen & Dahlia Lithwick, Lousy Judgment, SLATE (Oct. 31, 2014, 4:09 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/10/judicial_election_outra-
geous_ads_campaign_contributions_break_records.html (showing an ad run against judicial candi-
date in 2014 that asserted candidate said “child pornography is a victimless crime”); A.J. Vicens, 7 
Incredibly Sleazy Ads Targeting Judges, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 28, 2014, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/10/videos-sleazy-attack-ads-judicial-elections-dark-
money (showing, inter alia, an ad run against a state supreme court justice asserting that she “[s]ides 
with child predators”). 
 242.  See, e.g., Redish & Aronoff, supra note 227, at 2; Scott D. Wiener, Note, Popular Justice: 
State Judicial Elections and Procedural Due Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 187, 188–89 
(1996). 
 243.  See Bopp & Woudenberg, supra note 234, at 307; Unsuccessful Reform Efforts, NAT’L 
CTR. FOR ST. CTS., http://judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/reform_efforts/failed_reform_ef-
forts.cfm?state= (last visited Feb. 21, 2018). 
 244.  See Croley, supra note 228, at 724. 
 245.  See James Bopp, Jr., The Perils of Merit Selection, 46 IND. L. REV. 87, 92 (2013). 
 246.  Id. 
 247.  See AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, supra note 213 (reporting that twenty-three states and the 
District of Columbia use either merit selection alone or merit selection in combination with other 
methods). 
 248.  See Michael E. DeBow & Brannon P. Denning, Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar, the 
First Amendment, and the Continuing Campaign to Delegitimize Judicial Elections, 68 VAND. L. 
REV. EN BANC 113, 123–24 (2015), https://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/wp-content/up-
loads/sites/89/2015/01/Williams-Yulee-v.-The-Florida-Bar-the-First-Amendment-and-the-Contin-
uing-Campaign-to-Delegitimize-Judicial-Elections.pdf; see supra note 213 and accompanying text. 
 249.  See Michael Linton Wright, Comment, Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar: Judicial Elections, 
Impartiality, and the Threat to Free Speech, 93 DENV. L. REV. 551, 575 (2016). 
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B.  White’s Application of Strict Scrutiny to Judicial Campaign Speech 
The persistent prevalence of electing judges infused the Court’s holding 
in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White250 with large import.  The statute 
challenged in White had forbidden a candidate for judicial office—including 
incumbent judges—to “announce his or her views on disputed legal or polit-
ical issues.”251  The prohibition encompassed a wide range of expressions, 
including criticism of a past court decision while intimating an openness to 
overturning that decision.252  To justify the “announce clause,” Minnesota 
pointed to two interests that the restriction served: judicial impartiality and 
the appearance of judicial impartiality.253  In reviewing the provision, the 
Court accepted as “correct” the parties’ stipulation that strict scrutiny was the 
pertinent standard.254  This standard was based on the premise that the an-
nounce clause was a content-based restriction of speech “at the core of our 
First Amendment freedoms” since it concerned the fitness of candidates for 
public office.255 
While the application of strict scrutiny alone probably doomed the an-
nounce clause,256 the Court’s elaboration of its rationale portended broader 
threats to limitations on judicial campaign speech.  Under the First Amend-
ment, as construed by Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in White, the fact that 
judicial campaigns involve elections far exceeds in importance the result that 
the officials chosen are judges.257  It is true that the Court disclaimed an intent 
to “assert []or imply that the First Amendment requires campaigns for judi-
cial office to sound the same as those for legislative office.”258  Viewed in the 
context of the Court’s full opinion, however, this disavowal should be seen 
as a slight qualification of the Court’s application of principles governing 
political speech to judicial elections.  Responding to Justice Ginsburg’s con-
tention that the distinctive character of the judiciary warrants special latitude 
                                                          
 250.  536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
 251.  Id. at 768 (quoting MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000)). 
 252.  Id. at 772. 
 253.  Id. at 775. 
 254.  Id. at 774.  Justice Kennedy was prepared to go even further and apply a rule of per se 
invalidity to such a content-based restriction falling outside established exceptions.  Id. at 793 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring) (“The political speech of candidates is at the heart of the First Amendment, 
and direct restrictions on the content of candidate speech are simply beyond the power of govern-
ment to impose.”). 
 255.  Id. at 774 (majority opinion) (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 
861, 863 (8th Cir. 2001)). 
 256.  See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1451 (2d ed. 1988) (“When 
expressed as a standard for judicial review, strict scrutiny is . . . ‘strict’ in theory and usually ‘fatal’ 
in fact.” (quoting Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: 
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972))). 
 257.  White, 536 U.S. at 781–84. 
 258.  Id. at 783. 
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to regulate judicial candidates’ speech,259  Justice Scalia accused her of 
“greatly exaggerat[ing] the difference between judicial and legislative elec-
tions.”260  For the majority, the operative principle was the inextricability of 
elections and unhindered political speech.261  Thus, the state could not 
“leav[e] . . . elections in place while preventing candidates from discussing 
what the elections are about”262; rather, it was “imperative that [candidates 
for public office] be allowed freely to express themselves on matters of cur-
rent public importance.”263 
The operation of strict scrutiny was rendered even more potent by the 
Court’s conception of the state’s asserted interest in preserving the impartial-
ity of its judges.  As Justice Scalia explained, impartiality in this sense meant 
“lack of bias for or against either party to the proceeding.”264  The announce 
clause was not narrowly—or even appreciably—tailored to serve this interest 
because it “does not restrict speech for or against particular parties, but rather 
speech for or against particular issues.”265  While the Court was willing to 
entertain a second meaning of impartiality—“lack of preconception in favor 
                                                          
 259.  Justice Ginsburg, joined by the other three dissenters, argued that because “judges perform 
a function fundamentally different from that of the people’s elected representatives,” judicial elec-
tions need not possess “all the trappings of legislative and executive races.”  Id. at 803, 808 (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting).  A state was therefore entitled to place limitations on judicial campaign speech 
impermissible in other kinds of elections to buttress judges’ obligation to keep above “the partisan 
fray.”  Id. at 807.  Justice Stevens, also writing for all the dissenters, likewise accused the majority 
of ignoring the “fundamental distinction between campaigns for the judiciary and the political 
branches.”  Id. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  He believed the Court had underestimated the state’s 
interest in “judicial independence and impartiality” and wrongly equated judicial candidates’ free-
dom to comment on public issues with that of political candidates.  Id.; see also Briffault, supra 
note 6, at 184 (“If campaign practices that are unexceptionable (or even constitutionally protected) 
in the context of legislative or executive elections have a distinct and harmful impact on the judicial 
function, then they can be restricted in judicial election campaigns.”). 
 260.  White, 536 U.S. at 784 (majority opinion). 
 261.  See id. at 788 (“If the State chooses to tap the energy and the legitimizing power of the 
democratic process, it must accord the participants in that process . . . the First Amendment rights 
that attach to their roles.” (alteration in original) (quoting Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 349 (1991) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting))); see also id. at 792 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“If the State has a prob-
lem with judicial impartiality, it is largely one the State brought upon itself by continuing the prac-
tice of popularly electing judges.”). 
 262.  Id. at 788 (majority opinion); see also id. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Minnesota 
may not . . . censor what the people hear as they undertake to decide for themselves which candidate 
is most likely to be an exemplary judicial officer.”). 
 263.  Id. at 781–82 (majority opinion) (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 395 (1962)); 
see also id. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The State may not regulate the content of candidate 
speech merely because the speakers are candidates.”); Alan B. Morrison, The Judge Has No Robes: 
Keeping the Electorate in the Dark About What Judges Think About the Issues, 36 IND. L. REV. 719, 
736 (2003) (“If the voting public is to make reasoned choices [about judicial candidates], it should 
have more rather than less information than [current restrictions allow].”). 
 264.  White, 536 U.S. at 775 (majority opinion) (emphasis omitted). 
 265.  Id. at 776 (emphasis omitted). 
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of or against a particular legal view”—the announce clause’s effort to pro-
mote this interest failed the other prong of strict scrutiny.266  Such a tabula 
rasa quality was neither attainable nor desirable, much less compelling; any 
candidate worthy of the judiciary will have considered legal issues suffi-
ciently to have formed opinions on them.267  By extension, the state’s asserted 
interest in maintaining the appearance of this brand of impartiality also did 
not qualify as a compelling interest.268  Finally, the Court dispensed with as-
sessing impartiality as openness to entertaining views opposed to the judge’s 
preconceptions because it did not believe that the Minnesota Supreme Court 
had adopted the announce clause for this purpose.269  Rather, the breadth of 
settings in which judges could still state their views—including judicial opin-
ions, writings, lectures, and instruction—left the clause’s restriction “so woe-
fully underinclusive as to render belief in that purpose a challenge to the cred-
ulous.”270 
C.  Responses to White 
Reaction to White’s implications for other restrictions on judicial cam-
paign speech varied among scholars, states, and—to a lesser extent—courts.  
One leading scholar believed that existing limitations of narrower scope and 
weightier justification than the announce clause remained valid in the wake 
of White.271  A number of other commentators also voiced some level of con-
fidence that the Court had not dealt a fatal blow to these restrictions.272  Par-
ticular optimism was expressed about the prospects of the pledges or prom-
ises clause,273 which forbids “pledges or promises of conduct in office other 
than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office.”274  At 
the same time, some observers took a more ominous view of the future of 
                                                          
 266.  Id. at 777 (emphasis omitted). 
 267.  See id. at 777–78. 
 268.  Id. at 778. 
 269.  Id. 
 270.  Id. at 780. 
 271.  See Briffault, supra note 6, at 209–33. 
 272.  See, e.g., Francisco R. Maderal, Regulating Judicial Campaign Speech: Republican Party 
of Minnesota v. White on Remand, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 809, 817–19 (2006); Barbara E. Reed, 
Tripping the Rift: Navigating Judicial Speech Fault Lines in the Post-White Landscape, 56 MERCER 
L. REV. 971, 972 (2005); Tobin A. Sparling, Keeping up Appearances: The Constitutionality of the 
Model Code of Judicial Conduct’s Prohibition of Extrajudicial Speech Creating the Appearance of 
Bias, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 441, 444–45 (2006). 
 273.  See, e.g., Moerke, supra note 6, at 310 (describing the future of the clause as “fairly 
bright”). 
 274.  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2004). 
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such restraints.275  Revisions of state codes in the period following White sim-
ilarly reflected diverse assessments of the ruling’s impact.  These included 
officially acknowledging the decision while leaving restrictions intact,276 
swift abrogation of the announce clause,277 narrowing the reach of the com-
mit clause,278 and relaxing279 or simply eliminating280 the pledges or promises 
clause.  In a kind of averaging of states’ responses, the ABA loosened the 
restrictions in its Model Code of Judicial Conduct in the immediate aftermath 
of White and then again a few years later.281 
In contrast to these mixed responses, lower courts overwhelmingly (if 
not uniformly282) invalidated judicial campaign speech restrictions chal-
lenged under White.  Within just a few years after the ruling, various federal 
                                                          
 275.  See, e.g., Friedland, supra note 7, at 570–71; Richard L. Hasen, First Amendment Limits 
on Regulating Judicial Campaigns, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, 
AND LEGAL STAKES FOR JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 15, 15–16 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007),  
 276.  See, e.g., Brian S. Faughnan & Lucian T. Pera, First Amendment Shock Waves: Will 
Court’s New Rules Help Tennessee Judicial Candidates Deal with Aftershocks of ‘White’ Deci-
sion?, TENN. B.J., June 2006, at 14, 20–21, 27 (describing Tennessee’s replacing commentary of, 
but not text of, state’s commit clause); Rick A. Johnson, Judicial Campaign Speech in Kentucky 
After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 30 N. KY. L. REV. 347, 383–84 (2003) (quoting 
memorandum of Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission asserting that White did not affect state’s 
canon on judicial statements). 
 277.  E.g., Amendment of Canon 7(B)(1)(c) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 571 Pa. xxxvii 
(2002). 
 278.  See, e.g., CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 5(B)(1) & advisory committee’s cmt. 
(1996) (amended 2003) (retaining prohibition on candidates’ statements “that commit the candi-
date . . . with respect to cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the courts” but 
rescinding ban on statements that “appear to commit” the candidate in these ways). 
 279.  See, e.g., Approval of Amendments to the Tex. Code of Judicial Conduct, No. 02-9167 
(Tex. Aug. 22, 2002), http://www.txcourts.gov/All_Archived_Documents/SupremeCourt/Adminis-
trativeOrders/miscdocket/02/02916700.pdf (replacing ban on pledges or promises regarding judi-
cial duties “other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office” with pro-
hibition regarding “pending or impending cases, specific classes of cases, specific classes of 
litigants, or specific propositions of law that would suggest to a reasonable person that the judge is 
predisposed to a probable decision in cases within the scope of the pledge”). 
 280.  See, e.g., Order Amending Preamble to Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct (Ga. Jan. 7, 
2004), http://www.gasupreme.us/rules/amendments-to-rules/jqc_7_27_or/ (deleting Georgia’s 
pledges or promises clause); N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (amended 2006), 
http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/JudicialStandards/Documents/Amendments-
NCJudicialCode.pdf. 
 281.  See Stern, supra note 6, at 77–78. 
 282.  See, e.g., Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704, 715–17 (7th Cir. 2010) (upholding, inter alia, 
Indiana’s “commits clauses”). 
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courts struck down the commit clause,283 the pledges or promises clause,284 
the solicitation clause,285 the partisan activities clause,286 and the misrepresent 
clause.287  Decisions by the highest courts of Florida288 and New York289 up-
holding restrictions departed from this pattern; however, the decisions’ ques-
tionable status as outliers was compounded by the potential bias inherent in 
ruling on canons that the courts themselves had issued.290 
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES OF THE MISREPRESENT CLAUSE 
In the ABA’s current formulation, the misrepresent clause forbids judi-
cial candidates to “knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth, make 
any false or misleading statement.”291  The incorporation of defamation’s ac-
tual malice requirement292 is obviously designed to shield this prohibition 
from First Amendment attack.  That strategy is consistent with the reasoning 
of courts that have invalidated state misrepresent clauses for setting exces-
sively low thresholds of intent.293  Under the logic, principles, and themes 
that animate Alvarez and White, however, even this barrier to liability appears 
to fall short of the protection required by the Court. 
                                                          
 283.  E.g., Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1083 
(D. Alaska 2005), vacated and remanded in part, 504 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2007); Kan. Judicial Watch 
v. Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1228–34 (D. Kan. 2006), vacated as moot sub nom. Kan. Judicial 
Review v. Stout, 562 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 2009); Family Tr. Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Wolnitzek, 345 
F. Supp. 2d 672, 696–704 (E.D. Ky. 2004); N.D. Family All., Inc. v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 
1042 (D.N.D. 2005).  
 284.  E.g., Feldman, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 1083; Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 1228–34; Wolnitzek, 345 
F. Supp. 2d at 696–704; Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 1042.  
 285.  E.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 763–66 (8th Cir. 2005); Weaver 
v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1322–23 (11th Cir. 2002); Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 1235–38. 
 286.  E.g., Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72, 88–90 
(N.D.N.Y. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 351 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 287.  Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1319–22. 
 288.  In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 86–87 (Fla. 2003) (upholding commit clause and pledges or 
promises clause). 
 289.  In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 5–8 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam) (upholding pledges or promises 
clause); In re Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287, 1290–93 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam) (upholding political ac-
tivities clause). 
 290.  See In re Code of Judicial Conduct, 643 So. 2d 1037, 1040 (Fla. 1994); Rules Governing 
Judicial Conduct, STATE OF N.Y. COMM’N ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT, http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Le-
gal.Authorities/rgjc.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2018). 
 291.  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 4.1(A)(11) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011) (footnote omit-
ted). 
 292.  See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 293.  See infra notes 295–304 and accompanying text. 
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A.  The Misrepresent Clause in the Courts 
Even before the ruling in White cast doubt over restrictions on judicial 
campaign speech, the putatively sturdy misrepresent clause294 encountered 
setbacks in court.  Once armed with the strict scrutiny prescribed by White, 
challenges unsurprisingly increased in potency.  The protection accorded fal-
sity by Alvarez rendered states’ misrepresent clauses still more vulnerable to 
litigation over their validity.  Yet, even recent decisions have generally con-
tinued to focus on flaws in legislative draftsmanship rather than question the 
state’s underlying ability to penalize judicial campaign speech officially 
branded untrue. 
A harbinger of the wider trouble the misrepresent clause would face ar-
rived two years before White in cases decided in three states.  In In re 
Chmura,295 the Michigan Supreme Court declared overbroad a canon stating 
that a candidate for judicial office: 
should not use or participate in the use of any form of public com-
munication that the candidate knows or reasonably should know is 
false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, or which contains a mate-
rial misrepresentation of fact or law or omits a fact necessary to 
make the statement considered as a whole not materially mislead-
ing, or which is likely to create an unjustified expectation about the 
results the candidate can achieve.296 
The court found that the canon chilled “core political speech” because 
its ban was not limited to statements “bear[ing] on the impartiality of the 
judiciary,” reached not only false statements but also statements deemed 
“misleading or deceptive,” and “extend[ed] beyond the candidate’s actual 
statement to permit discipline for factual omissions.”297  To save the statute, 
the court narrowly construed it to provide that a judicial candidate “should 
not knowingly, or with reckless disregard, use or participate in the use of any 
form of public communication that is false.”298 
A few months later, the federal district court in Butler v. Alabama Judi-
cial Inquiry Commission299 relied on Chmura as “well reasoned and persua-
sive authority”300 in disapproving of an Alabama canon that in part barred 
judicial candidates from publishing “true information about a judicial candi-
date or an opponent that would be deceiving or misleading to a reasonable 
                                                          
 294.  See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 295.  608 N.W.2d 31 (Mich. 2000). 
 296.  Id. at 36 (quoting MICH. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(d) (1974)). 
 297.  Id. at 42. 
 298.  Id. at 43. 
 299.  111 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (M.D. Ala. 2000). 
 300.  Id. at 1233. 
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person.”301  On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit certified three questions to the Supreme Court of Alabama and invited 
the court to consider whether the prohibitions violated the First Amend-
ment.302  Quoting extensively from the federal district court’s opinion, the 
Alabama court ruled the canon not narrowly tailored to serve the state’s in-
terest in protecting the integrity of the judiciary.303  Accordingly, the state 
court narrowed the canon to exclude the reference to deceptive or misleading 
statements and prohibit only “demonstrably false information” about a judi-
cial candidate or an opponent disseminated with actual malice.304 
Less than a month after Butler was decided, the district court in Weaver 
v. Bonner305 struck down a Georgia canon that in part barred judicial candi-
dates from engaging in public communication that “the candidate knows or 
reasonably should know is false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, or con-
tains a material misrepresentation of fact or law or omits a fact necessary to 
make the communication considered as a whole not materially mislead-
ing.”306  Like the district court in Butler, the court in Weaver was persuaded 
by and drew heavily from the Michigan Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Chmura.307  The court determined that the Georgia canon failed for over-
breadth because its prohibition was not confined to “false statements that are 
knowingly made.”308  Rather, the proscription also encompassed “mislead-
ing, deceptive, and fraudulent statements”; “statements containing material 
misrepresentations of fact or law”; and “statements that omit a fact necessary 
to make the communication considered as a whole not materially mislead-
ing.”309  Indeed, the canon’s scope was ruled so far beyond permissible 
                                                          
 301.  Id. at 1227 (quoting ALA. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 7(B)(2) (1998)).  The pro-
hibition in full forbade candidates to:  
Post, publish, broadcast, transmit, circulate, or distribute false information concerning a 
judicial candidate or an opponent, either knowing the information to be false or with 
reckless disregard of whether the information is false; or post, publish, broadcast, trans-
mit, circulate, or distribute true information about a judicial candidate or an opponent that 
would be deceiving or misleading to a reasonable person. 
Id. (quoting ALA. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 7B(2) (effective Jan. 1, 1998)). 
 302.  Butler v. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, 245 F.3d 1257, 1265–66 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 303.  Butler v. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, 802 So. 2d 207, 217–18 (Ala. 2001). 
 304.  Id. at 218. 
 305.  114 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (N.D. Ga. 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 309 F.3d 1312 (11th 
Cir. 2002). 
 306.  Id. at 1339 (quoting GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(d)). 
 307.  See id. at 1342–43. 
 308.  Id. at 1342. 
 309.  Id.  Further aggravating the canon’s overbreadth was its prohibition of “statements likely 
to create an unjustified expectation about results the candidate can achieve . . . [regardless of] 
whether [the statements] are made knowingly or negligently.”  Id. 
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bounds that it could not be rehabilitated by a narrowing construction without 
wholesale judicial revision of its text.310 
The Supreme Court’s later ruling in White furnished support for the ap-
proach taken in Weaver.  Indeed, less than two months after White was 
handed down, the Eleventh Circuit pointed to the Court’s decision in con-
firming the invalidity of the Georgia canon at issue.311  In the eyes of the 
Eleventh Circuit, White “suggests that the standard for judicial elections 
should be the same as the standard for legislative and executive elections.”312  
Accordingly, the court looked to Brown v. Hartlage313 in adopting strict scru-
tiny for regulation of judicial candidates’ campaign speech314 and the actual 
malice requirement for their false expression.315  Georgia’s restriction failed 
this standard because it prohibited false statements negligently made and true 
statements that were misleading or deceptive, thus depriving candidates of 
the “breathing space” mandated by the First Amendment.316  The Eleventh 
Circuit’s holding, however, did not trigger an immediate avalanche of inval-
idated bans on false or misleading judicial campaign speech.  A year after 
Weaver, the Florida Supreme Court upheld discipline of a judicial candidate 
for misrepresenting her incumbent’s revocation of a criminal defendant’s 
bond.317  Later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court deadlocked on a 3-3 vote over 
whether an incumbent judge’s allegedly false campaign advertisement was 
protected under White.318  Still, the stage was set for the Court’s ruling in 
Alvarez to give further impetus to challenges to prohibitions on false judicial 
campaign speech. 
While Alvarez is sometimes invoked in disciplinary proceedings for un-
truthful speech, its impact on these cases has been mixed.  A federal district 
court recently drew on Alvarez in striking down an Ohio rule whose ban 
reached judicial campaign speech “that is not false and not even obviously 
misleading.”319  Hence, the rule clashed with the principle articulated by Jus-
tice Kennedy in Alvarez that the Constitution “stands against the idea that we 
                                                          
 310.  See id. at 1343 (declining to remove problematic negligence language). 
 311.  Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 312.  Id. at 1321. 
 313.  456 U.S. 45 (1982); see supra notes 73–88 and accompanying text. 
 314.  Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1319. 
 315.  Id. at 1319, 1321. 
 316.  Id. at 1319 (citing Brown, 456 U.S. at 61). 
 317.  In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 82–83 (Fla. 2003). 
 318.  Compare In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gableman, 784 N.W.2d 631, 647 
(Wis. 2010) (Prosser, Roggensack, & Ziegler, JJ.) (finding that advertisement was protected under 
White), with In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gableman, 784 N.W.2d 605, 630 (Wis. 
2010) (Abrahamson, C.J., Bradley & Crooks, JJ.) (concluding that advertisement was subject to 
discipline). 
 319.  O’Toole v. O’Connor, No. 2:15-cv-1446, 2016 WL 4394135, at *14 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 18, 
2016). 
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need Oceania’s Ministry of Truth.”320  Similarly striking down Ohio’s ban on 
a particular species of misleading campaign speech,321 the Ohio Supreme 
Court prominently featured (as controlling322) the Alvarez plurality’s strin-
gent review of content-based restrictions.323  By contrast, the Sixth Circuit 
during this same period ignored Alvarez while finding one Kentucky rule un-
enforceable as to the candidate in question and another facially invalid.  In 
Winter v. Wolnitzek,324 the court ruled constitutional a clause barring a judge 
or judicial candidate from “‘knowingly’ or ‘with reckless disregard for the 
truth’ making any ‘false [ ] statements’ during a campaign”325; its application 
was invalid in this instance, however, because the candidate’s allegedly false 
statement could plausibly be construed as true.326  Meanwhile, the state’s ban 
on candidates’ misleading statements failed altogether because “only a ban 
on conscious falsehoods satisfies strict scrutiny.”327  In Attorney Grievance 
Commission of Maryland v. Stanalonis,328 Maryland’s high court also did not 
rely on Alvarez in dismissing a charge against the defendant for false cam-
paign speech.329  Because the suit focused on whether Stanalonis had acted 
with reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of his statement rather than the 
pertinent rule’s validity,330 however, the omission was entirely understanda-
ble. 
Unsurprisingly, courts upholding disciplinary action for false campaign 
speech since Alvarez tend to tacitly or expressly deny the relevance of the 
Court’s decision to that action.  In In re Parish,331 the Review Department of 
California’s Bar Court made no reference to Alvarez while determining that 
Parish was accountable for making a false allegation against his opponent.332  
The Ohio Supreme Court in Disciplinary Council v. Tamburrino333 likewise 
                                                          
 320.  Id. at *12 (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 723 (2012) (plurality opinion) 
(citing GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (Centennial ed. 2003) (1949))). 
 321.  The canon barred using the title of an office not currently held by a judicial candidate “in 
a manner that implies that the judicial candidate does currently hold that office.”  O’Neill v. Craw-
ford, 132 Ohio St. 3d 1472, 1472 (Ohio 2016) (quoting OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
4.3(C)). 
 322.  See supra notes 162–163 and accompanying text. 
 323.  See O’Neill, at 1472. 
 324.  834 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 325.  Id. at 693 (alteration in original) (quoting KY. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
5(B)(1)(c)). 
 326.  Id. 
 327.  Id. at 694. 
 328.  445 Md. 129, 126 A.3d 6 (2015). 
 329.  Id. at 146, 126 A.3d at 16. 
 330.  See id. at 145–46, 126 A.3d at 15–16. 
 331.  No. 12-o-15242, 2015 WL 514334 (Review Department State Bar Ct. Cal. Feb. 5, 2015). 
 332.  Id. at *1. 
 333.  No. 2016-0858, 2016 WL 7116096 (Ohio Dec. 7, 2016). 
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did not mention Alvarez when sustaining a sanction for violating a rule for-
bidding judicial candidates from disseminating false information about an 
opponent with actual malice.334  The omission was clearly conscious; the dis-
sent twice pointed to Alvarez in objecting that Tamburrino’s statements were 
susceptible to truthful interpretations.335  Finally, the District Court of Mon-
tana recently rejected a disciplined candidate’s attempted reliance on Alvarez 
on the ground that the decision’s reasoning did not apply to judicial elec-
tions.336 
B.  The Inherent Invalidity of the Misrepresent Clause 
The thrust of the misrepresent clause, whatever the provision’s varia-
tions among states, is to forbid judicial candidates from knowingly or reck-
lessly making false campaign statements.  However laudable the goals of this 
prohibition, it is hard to reconcile with the premises of White and Alvarez or 
with broader First Amendment principles from which these decisions draw.  
While lower courts have faulted deficient wording to overturn canons barring 
falsity,337 the entire enterprise may be futile under the Court’s jurisprudence 
in this area.  Several themes emerge that render such bans precarious. 
1.  Rejection of Judicial Uniqueness 
The outburst of criticism that greeted White from some quarters focused 
in large part on the Court’s asserted failure to recognize crucial distinctions 
between judicial and legislative elections.338  In doing so, critics echoed ob-
jections by the dissenters in White.339  The position criticized by scholars and 
dissenting Justices, of course, represents prevailing doctrine in this field.  Alt-
hough the White majority professed to “neither assert nor imply that the First 
Amendment requires campaigns for judicial office to sound the same as those 
for legislative office,”340 the remainder of the opinion dilutes the significance 
of this isolated disclaimer.  Similarly, while the Court later sustained an oth-
erwise impermissible limitation on judicial campaign finances,341 the special 
                                                          
 334.  See id. at *3 (setting forth OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4, r. 4.3(A)). 
 335.  Id. at *13, *16 (French, J., dissenting). 
 336.  Myers v. Thompson, 192 F. Supp. 3d 1129, 1140–41 (D. Mont. 2016). 
 337.  See supra notes 165–184 and accompanying text. 
 338.  See, e.g., Margaret H. Marshall, Address, Dangerous Talk, Dangerous Silence: Free 
Speech, Judicial Independence, and the Rule of Law, 24 SYDNEY L. REV. 455, 467–68 (2002) (ar-
guing that White “confuses judicial accountability with a politician’s accountability”); White, supra 
note 232, at 624, 635–36. 
 339.  See supra note 259. 
 340.  Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 783 (2002). 
 341.  See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015) (upholding rule barring ju-
dicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign funds). 
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dynamics of that context limit the holding’s reach.342  Arguments relying 
upon judicial exceptionalism thus appear to offer scant support for the mis-
represent clause. 
The Court’s opinion in White culminates with a declaration of its core 
thesis: “If the State chooses to tap the energy and the legitimizing power of 
the democratic process, it must accord the participants in that process . . . the 
First Amendment rights that attach to their roles.”343  Throughout the opinion, 
the Court assumed and insisted that First Amendment principles governing 
democratic elections transcend the settings in which they take place.344  In 
the same vein, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence employed language that could 
just have readily applied to the election of legislators: 
What Minnesota may not do, however, is censor what the people 
hear as they undertake to decide for themselves which candidate is 
most likely to be an exemplary judicial officer.  Deciding the rele-
vance of candidate speech is the right of the voters, not the State.  
The law in question here contradicts the principle that unabridged 
speech is the foundation of political freedom.345 
Indeed, the dissenting Justices vainly protested that the Court’s reliance 
on decisions like Brown involving nonjudicial contests was “manifestly out 
of place.”346 
Nor was White’s vigorous protection of judicial campaign speech rooted 
only in its sweeping view of the scope of First Amendment standards gov-
erning electoral expression.  In particular, the Court thought the distinctions 
between judicial and legislative officials insufficient to extend fewer safe-
guards to judicial campaign speech.347  Rather, the Court regarded the resem-
blance of the judicial to the legislative function as grounds for subjecting 
elections to these offices to the same fundamental principle of democratic 
accountability.348  Though in different ways, both kinds of officials forge 
state law; “[n]ot only do state-court judges possess the power to ‘make’ com-
mon law, but they have the immense power to shape the States’ constitutions 
                                                          
 342.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 343.  White, 536 U.S. at 788 (alteration in original) (quoting Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 349 
(1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). 
 344.  See supra notes 254–255 and accompanying text; see also Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitu-
tionalizing Judicial Ethics: Judicial Elections After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, Caper-
ton, and Citizens United, 64 ARK. L. REV. 1, 33 (2011) (“Once the state decides to have elections, 
that decision carries with it a certain amount of baggage.  Part of the baggage is the First Amend-
ment.  The state should not be able to take the politics out of politics.”). 
 345.  White, 536 U.S. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
 346.  Id. at 806–07 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 347.  Id. at 783 (majority opinion). 
 348.  Id. at 783–84. 
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as well.”349  Accordingly, as with legislative candidates, voters are entitled to 
learn the views and predilections of those who would govern from the 
bench.350 
White’s discounting of the distinction between judges and legislators 
leaves the misrepresent clause peculiarly vulnerable to attack.  If Alvarez im-
plicitly confirms that candidates for legislative seats cannot be held to ac-
count for their dishonesty,351 then a conception of judges and legislators as 
performing similar functions should confer a comparable immunity on judi-
cial candidates.  After all, the vice of lying and virtue of truth-telling do not 
alter their status when transplanted from the legislative to the judicial realm.  
On the contrary, there exists “a public interest in the honesty of all elected 
officials and in the public’s confidence in the honesty of all those in 
power.”352 
2.  The (Limited) Value of Honesty 
Even putting aside comparisons with nonjudicial officials, it is not at all 
clear that curbing dishonesty by judicial candidates constitutes a sufficiently 
weighty interest to justify its suppression.  The White Court was willing to 
recognize as compelling only the state’s interest in preserving a narrowly 
confined form of impartiality.353 
While White did not present an occasion for the Court to assess the 
state’s interest in banning false campaign speech, the opinion’s skeptical tone 
toward restrictions on such speech augurs poorly for the misrepresent 
clause.354  Although false or misleading speech reflects poorly on the charac-
ter of a judicial candidate, its bearing on the candidate’s capacity to render 
impartial decisions is highly speculative.  History offers ample examples of 
exceedingly capable office holders whose dubious past practices would not 
                                                          
 349.  Id. at 784. 
 350.  See id. at 781–82 (“The role that elected officials play in our society makes it all the more 
imperative that they be allowed freely to express themselves on matters of current public im-
portance.” (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 395 (1962))); see also Dimino, supra note 217, 
at 363 (“The fact that judges do use their policy preferences to shape the law . . . makes it critical, 
from a democratic perspective, that the public be aware of the policy orientations of the judges it 
selects.”). 
 351.  See supra Part I.B.2. 
 352.  Briffault, supra note 6, at 220.  Cf. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 
410, 429–31 (1993) (striking down ban on distribution of “commercial” publications through news-
racks on public property because non-commercial publications caused comparable harms to asserted 
government interests). 
 353.  See supra notes 264–265 and accompanying text. 
 354.  Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 781–82 (2002). 
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have anticipated such a career.355  As already suggested, for example, it 
would be difficult to trace a systematic correlation between the veracity of 
presidential candidates and their success in office once elected.356  In any 
event, Alvarez instructs not only that the state may not punish falsity qua fal-
sity, but also that the First Amendment presumes that the appropriate re-
sponse to false speech is counterspeech rather than censorship.357 
Alvarez did recognize government’s power to prohibit falsity associated 
with a specific harm, but the harms invoked to support the misrepresent 
clause appear no more able to sustain that ban than were the injuries cited in 
Alvarez to justify the Stolen Valor Act.  There, the government unsuccess-
fully argued that statements proscribed by the SVA “compromised and frus-
trated” the “integrity and purpose” of the Congressional Medal of Honor.358  
Similarly, courts upholding the misrepresent clause have typically pointed to 
the interest in avoiding damage to the courts’ integrity and its perception by 
the public.359  If anything, however, this interest seems less palpable—and 
less connected to the statute’s ban—than the SVA’s goal of “‘recognizing 
and expressing gratitude [through military medals] for acts of heroism and 
sacrifice in military service,’” and  ‘“foste[ring] morale, mission accomplish-
ment and esprit de corps’ among service members.”360  It has also been sug-
gested that the misrepresent clause can be understood as a means of averting 
the harm to informed judicial elections wrought by candidates’ falsehoods.361  
This defense, however, is in tension with the insufficiency of that rationale 
in the political realm,362 Alvarez’s prescription of counterspeech to address 
ills caused by falsity, and the Court’s broader resistance to paternalistic ra-
tionales for restrictions on speech.363 
                                                          
 355.  See, e.g., DAVID NASAW, THE PATRIARCH: THE REMARKABLE LIFE AND TURBULENT 
TIMES OF JOSEPH P. KENNEDY 70–82, 213–37 (2012); RICHARD WINSTON, THOMAS BECKET 53–
195 (1967). 
 356.  See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 357.  See supra notes 143–145 and accompanying text. 
 358.  United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 716 (2012) (plurality opinion). 
 359.  See, e.g., Berger v. Supreme Court, 598 F. Supp. 69, 75 (S.D. Ohio 1984); see also In re 
Bybee, 716 N.E.2d 957, 960 (Ind. 1999) (“[T]he ability of judges to provide litigants due process 
and due course of law is directly and unavoidably affected by the way in which candidates campaign 
for judicial office.”); In re Nadeau, 914 A.2d 714, 720 (Me. 2007) (“The Canon is designed to 
maintain and enhance public confidence in an independent, fair and competent judiciary . . . .”). 
 360.  Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 724 (quoting Brief for Petitioner, supra note 116, at 37–38). 
 361.  See Briffault, supra note 6, at 221. 
 362.  See supra Part I.A.2. 
 363.  See infra Part III.B.3. 
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3.  The First Amendment’s Antipaternalism 
The aim of ensuring that false speech does not lead citizens to cast un-
wise votes is laudable, but the misrepresent clause is a constitutionally doubt-
ful means of achieving it.  As the Court has explained, “[a] ‘highly paternal-
istic approach’ limiting what people may hear is generally suspect.”364  
Specifically, the Court has deemed “[t]he State’s fear that voters might make 
an ill-advised choice” inadequate grounds for restricting speech.365  Even in 
the sphere of commercial speech, the Court has rejected the “paternalistic 
assumption” that consumers must be shielded from information that the state 
fears they will misuse.366  In one case invalidating a restriction on commercial 
speech, the Court’s holding rested on the philosophy that “[t]he First Amend-
ment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep peo-
ple in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.”367  
Granted, the Court’s rulings and pronouncements in these cases have as-
sumed that the commercial speech in question is truthful.368  However, the 
Court has long accepted that the distinctive attributes of commercial speech 
allow government special latitude to take measures to ensure its accuracy and 
clarity that would be impermissible in other realms of expression.369  Cam-
paign speech, lying at the core of First Amendment protection,370 does not 
afford government such leeway. 
Together, Alvarez and White reflect the principle that it is not for gov-
ernment to dictate what expression citizens are capable of processing.  As 
Justice Kennedy pointed out in Alvarez, citizens showed themselves capable 
of exposing Alvarez’s mendacity without the aid of an official truth commis-
sion.371  This anti-paternalistic philosophy acquires heightened force when 
applied to judicial campaign speech—expression that the White Court located 
“at the core of our First Amendment freedoms.”372  As the Washington Su-
preme Court stated in striking down a ban on false political advertising, this 
type of law impermissibly “assumes the people of this state are too ignorant 
or disinterested to investigate, learn, and determine for themselves the truth 
                                                          
 364.  Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223–24 (1989) (quoting Va. State 
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)). 
 365.  Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982). 
 366.  44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 497 (1996) (plurality opinion); accord 
Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n, 496 U.S. 91, 105 & n.13 (1990) (plurality 
opinion). 
 367.  Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 375 (2002) (quoting 44 Liquormart, Inc., 
517 U.S. at 503). 
 368.  See id. at 374; 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 497; Peel, 496 U.S. at 108. 
 369.  See Va. State Bd. of Pharm., 425 U.S. at 772 n.24. 
 370.  See supra Part I.A.2. 
 371.  See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 372.  Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774 (2002) (quoting Republican Party 
of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 861, 863 (8th Cir. 2001)). 
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or falsity in political debate, and it is the proper role of the government itself 
to fill the void.”373 
Moreover, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Alvarez recognized that pater-
nalistic justifications for laws may mask less benign motives.  History is re-
plete with regimes of censorship based on the state’s self-serving claim that 
it must shield its citizens from pernicious falsehoods.  Thus, Justice Ken-
nedy’s dark reference to the specter of Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four374 
highlights that government’s condescending view of citizens’ capacity for 
divining falsehood is not only unnecessary but also dangerous.  In addition, 
the danger of government overreaching in this area is exacerbated by the 
blurry line that can exist between provably false assertions and statements of 
belief, speculation, or opinion.  The issue of whether a defendant’s statement 
amounted to a factually demonstrable defamatory falsehood375 has spawned 
legions of cases.376  Of course, many statements can be proven to be defini-
tively false.  However, the calculus of interests that gives states latitude to 
provide a remedy for harm to private reputation from defamation377 does not 
obtain in political debate.378  Similarly, the government’s power to treat what 
might be considered commercial puffery as a false claim about a product379 
does not extend to dubious statements by political candidates.  While judicial 
candidates are obviously capable of uttering statements that are false, ceding 
to government the power of distinguishing truth from falsity in this arena 
poses a risk of tendentious enforcement intolerable under the First Amend-
ment.380 
                                                          
 373.  State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d 691, 699 (Wash. 
1998); see also List v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 45 F. Supp. 3d 765, 776 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (con-
cluding that a state law barring false statements about a proposed ballot initiative was actuated by 
an illegitimate interest in “paternalistically protecting the citizenry at large from ‘untruths’ identi-
fied by Government appointees”), aff’d sub nom. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 814 F.3d 466 
(6th Cir. 2016). 
 374.  See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 375.  See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1990) (requiring that statement 
be provable as false before there can be liability under state defamation law (citing Phila. Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986))). 
 376.  See Joseph H. King, Defamation Claims Based on Parody and Other Fanciful Communi-
cations Not Intended to Be Understood as Fact, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 875, 881–907. 
 377.  See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345–46 (1974). 
 378.  See supra Part I.A.2. 
 379.  See, e.g., Clorox Co. P.R. v. Proctor & Gamble Commercial Co., 228 F.3d 24, 39 (1st Cir. 
2000) (allowing false advertising claim to proceed where court concluded that advertisement’s state-
ment that “‘[w]hiter is not possible’ . . . invites consumers to compare [the product’s] whitening 
power against either other detergents acting alone or detergents used with chlorine bleach,” and that 
it “may be literally false.”). 
 380.  See Geoffrey R. Stone, The Rules of Evidence and the Rules of Public Debate, 1993 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 127, 140 (“The very power to make such determinations [of whether a political 
statement is false] invites abuse that could be profoundly destructive to public debate.”). 
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4.  The Double Bind of Strict Scrutiny 
Even assuming the sufficiency of the objectives underlying the misrep-
resent clause, the ban faces a daunting obstacle in the standard of review it 
would have to pass.  The manner in which the Court applied strict scrutiny to 
strike down Minnesota’s announce clause in White can be readily trained on 
the misrepresent clause.  On the one hand, the Court faulted the limited scope 
of the announce clause’s proscription as grounds for questioning the sincerity 
of the state’s professed goal of promoting judicial open-mindedness.381  That 
judicial candidates had so many other forums in which to express their views 
meant that open-mindedness could not have been the actual purpose being 
served by this selective restriction.382  On the other hand, a ban that encom-
passed these other channels of communication—e.g., books and 
speeches383—would surely have failed for overbreadth. 
The misrepresent clause is similarly (though not identically) vulnerable 
to charges of underinclusiveness whose cure would presumably entail sup-
pressing large swathes of protected speech.  A law targeting false and mis-
leading statements by a judicial candidate leaves such statements by the can-
didate’s supporters untouched, even though they also undermine an informed 
electorate and—if condoned by the candidate—judicial integrity.  Yet, the 
combination of maximum protection for political speech and the presumption 
in favor of counterspeech under Alvarez makes highly suspect a wholesale 
ban on false and misleading judicial campaign speech.  It is true that the Court 
has sometimes allowed government to address through a partial ban only a 
salient segment of a problem.384  Such latitude, however, exists when the 
Court applies the lenient rational relationship standard.385  This type of selec-
tivity has little chance of surviving the heightened scrutiny the Court applies 
to restrictions on the content of speech.386 
                                                          
 381.  Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 778–80 (2002). 
 382.  Id. at 780. 
 383.  Id. at 779. 
 384.  See, e.g., McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969) (“[A] legisla-
ture need not run the risk of losing an entire remedial scheme simply because it failed . . . to cover 
every evil that might conceivably have been attacked.”); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 
348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (“[R]eform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of 
the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.” (citing Semler v. Or. State Bd. of 
Dental Exam’rs, 294 U.S. 608 (1935))). 
 385.  See McDonald, 394 U.S. at 809; Williamson, 348 U.S. at 491. 
 386.  See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 384 n.4 (1992); Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. 
Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229 (1987); Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).  A similar 
illustration of strict scrutiny trapping a law in the pincer of underinclusiveness and overbreadth can 
be found in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011).  There, the Court found 
“wildly underinclusive” a ban on minors’ access to violent video games because testimony relied 
on by the state to show that such games stirred feelings of aggression also asserted that exposure to 
children’s cartoons on television portraying violence and pictures of guns stimulated similar feel-
ings.  Id. at 800–02.  Yet the Court itself implicitly acknowledged that a ban encompassing these 
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5.  Misplaced Reliance on Defamation’s Actual Malice Standard 
Both the ABA Model Code387 and some state judicial codes388 limit the 
misrepresent clause to false or misleading judicial campaign speech that is 
made with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.  This qual-
ification obviously draws from the level of intent known as actual malice that 
public officials389 and public figures390 must demonstrate to recover damages 
in libel suits.391  While the actual malice requirement has proved a quite po-
tent barrier to recovery,392 its application to judicial campaign speech may 
still offer inadequate protection.  Alvarez itself establishes that an actual mal-
ice requirement does not automatically confer validity on a prohibition of 
false expression; Alvarez’s lie about receiving the Medal of Honor epito-
mizes actual malice.393 
More importantly, the transplantation of even a generally speech-pro-
tective standard from its origin in defamation doctrine to judicial campaign 
speech ignores critical differences between the two types of expression.394  
Most conspicuously, of course, they lie at opposite ends of the hierarchy of 
expression.  Defamation is one of those “‘historic and traditional categories 
long familiar to the bar’ . . . ‘the prevention and punishment of which have 
                                                          
communications would prohibit an unacceptable amount of protected speech.  See id. at 801–02 
(“California has (wisely) declined to restrict Saturday morning cartoons . . . or the distribution of 
pictures of guns.”). 
 387.  See supra note 291 and accompanying text. 
 388.  E.g., CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 5(B)(1)(b) (2016); see also N.C. State Bar v. 
Hunter, No. COA09-1014, 2010 WL 2163362, at *9 (N.C. Ct. App. June 1, 2010) (rejecting de-
fendant’s argument that limitation of state’s misrepresent clause to intentional and knowing misrep-
resentations of judicial candidate’s identity or qualifications furnished insufficient protection under 
First Amendment). 
 389.  See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
 390.  See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring); Harry 
Kalven, Jr., The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 SUP. CT. 
REV. 267, 275–78 (describing how separate opinions produced this holding). 
 391.  See Tiffany L. Carwile, Note, Stop Restricting Speech and Educate the Public: A Review 
of the ABA’s Proposed Campaign Activity Canon of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 15 WM. 
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 1053, 1079 (2007) (asserting that a misrepresent clause confined to the actual 
malice standard has “no problem” with constitutionality). 
 392.  See John A. Neuenschwander, Is Fame Ever Fleeting? Contemporary Mission v. New 
York Times Co., COMM. & L., June 1990, at 27 (“The constitutionally imposed ‘actual malice’ 
standard . . . is a most formidable barrier that few plaintiffs ever scale.”). 
 393.  United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 713–14 (2012) (plurality opinion). 
 394.  See Commonwealth v. Lucas, 34 N.E.3d 1242, 1249–50 (Mass. 2015) (rejecting state’s 
attempt to “shoehorn” a statute criminalizing certain false statements about political candidates into 
standards governing defamation); In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gableman, 784 
N.W.2d 631, 643 (Wis. 2010) (Prosser, Roggensack, & Ziegler, JJ.) (“The Supreme Court’s discus-
sion of false statements in civil defamation cases is not appropriate to engraft onto cases addressing 
governmental regulations of political speech.”). 
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never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.’”395  Indeed, it is only 
the need to assure that libel laws do not deter “speech that matters” that has 
prompted the Court to extend a degree of “strategic protection to defamatory 
falsehood.”396  By stark contrast, political campaign speech—a category en-
compassing judicial campaigns under White—occupies the highest tier of 
protection under the First Amendment.  It should follow, then, that judicial 
candidates’ nondefamatory falsehoods receive even greater protection than 
the actual malice standard provides.397 
This conclusion is bolstered by the differing balance of interests impli-
cated in defamation suits and state suppression of judicial candidates’ alleged 
falsehoods.  In maintaining a regime of libel law, the state asserts its interest 
in “compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to reputation.”398  
The state thereby furnishes individuals a mechanism through which they can 
vindicate their interest in their good name—an interest that “reflects no more 
than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human 
being.”399  When the state provides sanctions for judicial candidates’ misrep-
resentations, however, it is not helping individuals achieve compensation for 
the invasion of a private right.  Rather, the state is limiting the exercise of a 
fundamental individual right in the service of important but unfocused inter-
ests in judicial integrity and an informed electorate.400  Thus, the compelling 
alignment between state and individual ends that justifies libel law is absent 
from this setting. 
6.  Intractable Problems of Manageability 
While the state has a valid interest in combatting false judicial campaign 
speech, that interest does not justify the First Amendment costs entailed by 
means of enforcing an outright ban.  Sanctions for its violation would inevi-
tably place government in the role of disrupting time-sensitive expression at 
the heart of the First Amendment.  As a practical matter, a formal charge 
                                                          
 395.  United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010) (first quoting Simon & Schuster, 
Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring); and then quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942)). 
 396.  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341–42 (1974); see also N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (rejecting rule placing on critics of official conduct the burden 
of proving the truth of their statements because they might “be deterred from voicing their criticism, 
even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it 
can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so”). 
 397.  Cf. N.Y. Times, 376 US. at 293 (Black, J., concurring) (arguing that the actual malice re-
quirement does not adequately protect defamatory speech by critics of official conduct because it is 
“an elusive, abstract concept”). 
 398.  Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348. 
 399.  Id. at 341 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
 400.  See Fried, supra note 72, at 238 (“[T]he First Amendment precludes punishment for gen-
eralized ‘public’ frauds, deceptions, and defamation.”). 
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would cast a shadow over a candidate and force a diversion of campaign re-
sources to rebutting the accusation.401  Moreover, the very specter of being 
subjected to this sort of proceeding could discourage candidates from engag-
ing in intrinsically protected expression.402  Only the premise—rejected in 
White—that ordinary principles governing political speech are suspended for 
judicial campaigns403 would validate this degree of interference. 
The objection to such a scheme begins with the difficulties, in both prin-
ciple and practice, of official determinations of the truth or falsity of cam-
paign speech.  It is disturbing enough under democratic theory and free 
speech doctrine to concede this power to government404—a tension com-
pounded in this context by the danger of partisan abuse by those charged with 
responsibility for enforcement.405  The problem is vastly exacerbated, how-
ever, by the processes of proof and refutation involved in assessing the truth-
fulness of a candidate’s statement.  The proliferation of libel suits concerning 
whether the statement in question can even be reasonably construed as con-
veying a provably false assertion406 suggests the potential scale of mischief 
unleashed by allowing this inquiry in the middle of a political campaign.407  
At least in defamation actions ample time is afforded for the defendant’s re-
sponse, discovery, and a full-blown trial before arriving at a conclusion about 
meaning and factual falsity.  This luxury is not available in a judicial cam-
paign, and the compressed timetable would threaten to compromise both the 
integrity of the outcome and accused candidates’ fair opportunity to conduct 
their campaign.  Moreover, the impact of the proceeding begs the question of 
what relief it might provide.  An official designation of the candidate’s state-
ment as false or misleading seems too slight a result to warrant such a massive 
intrusion into the campaign, while disqualification before the electorate has 
made its decision would be grossly—and likely unconstitutionally—dispro-
portionate to the violation.  Intermediate penalties (e.g., fines) are theoreti-
cally possible, but it is hard to conceive of how they could be calibrated and 
administered in a principled way. 
                                                          
 401.  See 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 766 F.3d 774, 792 (8th Cir. 2014) (“For all practical 
purposes, the real potential damage is done at the time a complaint [of alleged falsity in political 
advertising or campaign material] is filed.”). 
 402.  See N.Y. Times, 376 US. at 279 (rejecting restriction on speech tending to cause those sub-
ject to it to “steer far wider of the unlawful zone” (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 
(1958))). 
 403.  See supra notes 254–255 and accompanying text. 
 404.  See supra notes 100–101 and accompanying text. 
 405.  See Marshall, supra note 39, at 299. 
 406.  See supra notes 375–376 and accompanying text. 
 407.  See Marshall, supra note 39, at 300 (“[T]he availability of a lawsuit [against candidates for 
allegedly false statements] could become as much a partisan campaign tactic as the problem it is 
designed to address.”). 
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An alternative that addresses some of these difficulties but raises others 
would be to permit actions against successful candidates who allegedly owe 
their victory to campaign misrepresentations.  While this approach would en-
able a more deliberate proceeding than one held in the heat of a campaign, it 
would raise vexing issues of proof and finality.  Alvarez required that to up-
hold a ban on falsity, there must be established “a direct causal link between 
the restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented.”408  Surely it cannot 
be the case that every false utterance by a victorious judicial candidate is 
presumed to have tilted the race in that candidate’s favor.409  Thus, the pre-
siding tribunal would need to determine not only whether the statement at 
issue was false, but also whether its falsity was decisive to the election’s out-
come.  No readily apparent method exists for reliably making this determi-
nation. 
Even if a state were to adopt such a post-election proceeding in the face 
of these obstacles, the presumed remedies for violation would impose exor-
bitant costs.  That would, of course, be literally true if the outcome of a vio-
lation was invalidation of the election and the launch of a new one.  Given 
the various expenses involved—as well as the absence of assurance that the 
second campaign would not spawn fresh misrepresentations—this seems an 
unlikely course.  Additionally, even if these concerns were put aside, a larger 
one would loom.  The institutional instability that would result from having 
judicial elections routinely open to doubt would undermine both the judicial 
and democratic systems.  To a substantial extent, this same consideration ap-
plies even to the more modest and arguably more logical remedy of nullifying 
the winner’s election and placing his or her opponent in the contested seat.  
The prospect of a second chance would virtually invite defeated candidates 
to cry foul, thus negating the finality of elections on which effective govern-
ment depends.  The preference voiced in Alvarez for counterspeech as a rem-
edy for false expression,410  then, not only comports with First Amendment 
values but also serves the state’s own interests. 
                                                          
 408.  United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 725 (2012) (plurality opinion); see also Rodney A. 
Smolla, Words “Which By Their Very Utterance Inflict Injury”: The Evolving Treatment of Inher-
ently Dangerous Speech in Free Speech Law and Theory, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 317, 357–58 (2009) 
(Under the marketplace of ideas approach to free speech, “it is incumbent on the government to 
defend laws restricting expression by demonstrating that the expression is linked to some extraneous 
harm, to some palpable invasion of a legally protected societal or individual interest, such as na-
tional security or individual reputation or privacy.”). 
 409.  See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 885 (2009) (“[P]roving what ulti-
mately drives the electorate to choose a particular candidate is a difficult endeavor, not likely to 
lend itself to a certain conclusion.”). 
 410.  See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 726–28. 
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IV.  THE PERIPHERAL EXCEPTIONS OF CAPERTON AND WILLIAMS-YULEE 
Two Supreme Court decisions in the last decade, Caperton v. A.T. Mas-
sey Coal Co.411 and Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar,412 arguably throw into 
question this Article’s assertion that the misrepresent clause is invalid.  In 
both cases, the Court upheld restrictions that impinged on judicial campaign 
activity.413  In both, the Court “recognized the ‘vital state interest’ in safe-
guarding ‘public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the nation’s 
elected judges.’”414  Neither ruling, however, amounts to a challenge to vig-
orous First Amendment protection of judicial campaign speech under White, 
much less to the strict scrutiny under Alvarez for bans on falsity not demon-
strably linked to definite harm.  Rather, each upholds the state’s ability to 
enact narrowly defined measures to address distinctive dangers arising from 
judicial campaign contributions. 
A.  Caperton and Recusal 
While rather involved,415 the dispute in Caperton boiled down to the 
question of whether Chief Justice Brent Benjamin of the West Virginia Su-
preme Court should have recused himself in a case involving his chief polit-
ical benefactor, Don Blankenship.  Blankenship was the chairman, CEO, and 
President of A.T. Massey Coal Company (“Massey”), which had suffered a 
$50 million jury verdict in a suit brought by Hugh Caperton and corporations 
that he controlled.416  While the verdict was on appeal, Benjamin was elected 
to the West Virginia Supreme Court after a campaign in which Blankenship’s 
expenditures on behalf of Benjamin—$3 million—exceeded the total number 
of contributions by Benjamin’s other supporters and his campaign commit-
tee.417  In response to a series of motions for recusal on Massey’s appeal, 
Benjamin repeatedly refused to recuse himself and ultimately cast the deci-
sive vote in a 3-2 decision overturning the jury verdict.418 
On Caperton’s appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Court 
ruled that Benjamin’s involvement in the decision violated due process.419  
Key to the outcome was the Court’s application of an objective standard to 
determine whether a judge’s participation in a ruling affecting a campaign 
donor presents a substantial risk of bias rather than a requirement that actual 
                                                          
 411.  556 U.S. 868 (2009). 
 412.  135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015). 
 413.  Id at 1662; Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884–87. 
 414.  Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1666 (quoting Caperton, 556 U.S. at 889). 
 415.  See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 872–76. 
 416.  Id. at 872. 
 417.  Id. at 873. 
 418.  Id. at 873–75. 
 419.  Id. at 885–86. 
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subjective bias be demonstrated.420  Thus, the Court would inquire whether 
“the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too 
high to be constitutionally tolerable.”421  Under this analysis, two principal 
considerations—all pointing toward Benjamin’s recusal—would govern 
whether a judge should step aside in a case.  First, the Court would examine 
the scale of the donor’s contribution relative to both the total amount of 
money contributed to the campaign and the total amount spent in the election, 
as well as the contribution’s apparent role in securing the recipient’s elec-
tion.422  Also crucial was the compression of relevant events.  A contribution 
of such magnitude, made during the pendency of the case in question and 
followed by the judge’s election, would raise a reasonable perception that the 
judge had been influenced by gratitude toward the donor.423  In Caperton, the 
combination of these two elements sufficed to “offer[] a possible temptation 
to the average . . . judge to . . . lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear 
and true.”424 
Although Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion took pains to emphasize 
the rarity of the circumstances presented in Caperton,425 the four dissenters 
argued that the Court had opened the floodgates to a raft of “Caperton mo-
tions” by losing parties contending that the judge was probably biased.426  By 
failing to articulate a standard for constitutionally compelled recusal, the 
Court had virtually invited allegations of bias on a frequent if not routine 
basis.427  To underscore the uncertainty sewn by the vague new standard, 
Chief Justice Roberts posed forty questions that remained about the reach and 
operation of the Court’s ruling.428 
                                                          
 420.  See id. at 881–84. 
 421.  Id. at 877 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). 
 422.  See id. at 884. 
 423.  See id. at 884–86. 
 424.  Id. at 886 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 
475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986)). 
 425.  See id. at 887 (“The facts now before us are extreme by any measure.”); see also James 
Sample, Caperton: Correct Today, Compelling Tomorrow, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 293, 293 (2010) 
(arguing that Caperton is “correct in its narrowness”). 
 426.  Caperton, 556 U.S. at 899 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 903 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(predicting that the Court’s holding will “add[] to the vast arsenal of lawyerly gambits what will 
come to be known as the Caperton claim”). 
 427.  See id. at 890–91 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 902 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (The decision 
“create[s] vast uncertainty with respect to a point of law that can be raised in all litigated cases in 
(at least) those 39 States that elect their judges.”); see also Daniel Betts, How High Is Too High?: 
Judicial Elections and Recusal After Caperton, 15 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 247, 248 (2010) (“[T]he 
Caperton Court . . . failed to provide any guidance . . . .”). 
 428.  Caperton, 556 U.S. at 893–98 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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While Caperton undoubtedly upset settled doctrine governing due pro-
cess requirements for judicial qualification,429 its implications for the misrep-
resent clause are remote if not nonexistent.  As grist for challenging the mis-
represent clause, Caperton offers merely evidence that the First Amendment 
does not categorically discountenance every state restriction concerning ju-
dicial campaign activity.  Other than this broad and unremarkable proposi-
tion, however, there appears little in Caperton that would empower the state 
to bar judicial candidates from engaging in false or misleading speech.  Even 
if grounds for recusal are extended beyond the narrow scope envisioned by 
the Caperton majority,430 the brunt of this development would fall on due 
process rather than free speech doctrine.  This is especially true, of course, if 
any potential expansion remains within the Caperton rule’s stated field of 
campaign contributions.  Indeed, commentators have recognized that the 
Court’s decision the following year in the landmark campaign finance case 
Citizens United v. FEC431 overwhelmed any modest impact that Caperton 
might have in reducing the role of campaign spending.432 Even under specu-
lation that Caperton has some bearing on regulation of judicial campaign 
speech,433 however, recusal in a case based on comments made during a cam-
paign is a far cry from punishment for those comments.434  Moreover, regu-
lation of speech aimed at preserving judicial candidates’ impartiality once in 
office—however vulnerable since White—stands on a surer footing than at-
tempts to ensure candidates’ honesty.435 
                                                          
 429.  See Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Disqualification in the Aftermath of Caperton v. A.T. 
Massey Coal Co., 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 247, 248 (2010) (stating that constitutional doctrine of 
mandatory disqualification “all changed” in Caperton). 
 430.  See Andrey Spektor & Michael Zuckerman, Judicial Recusal and Expanding Notions of 
Due Process, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 977, 994 (2011) (“[E]xpecting lower courts to be selective in 
applying the [Caperton] rule in only ‘extreme’ cases is not realistic . . . .”). 
 431.  558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 432.  See Aviva Abramovsky, Justice for Sale: Contemplations on the “Impartial” Judge in a 
Citizens United World, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 713, 729; André Douglas Pond Cummings, Procur-
ing “Justice”?: Citizens United, Caperton, and Partisan Judicial Elections, 95 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 
89, 102 (2010); Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. 
REV. 581, 584 (2011); Adam Liptak et al., Caperton and the Courts: Did the Floodgates Open?, 18 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 481, 495 (2015). 
 433.  See Roy A. Schotland, Caperton Capers: Comment on Four of the Articles, 60 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 337, 344 (2010) (“Litigation about judicial campaign regulation is bound to be affected, in 
major ways, by Caperton’s underlying holding.”). 
 434.  See Spektor & Zuckerman, supra note 430, at 1001–02. 
 435.  See supra notes 232–234 and accompanying text. 
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B.  Williams-Yulee and Solicitation 
Conceivable grounds admittedly exist for invoking Williams-Yulee v. 
Florida Bar to bolster the misrepresent clause.436  Read in isolation, the 
Court’s recognition of the difference between judicial and political elections, 
and of the state’s strong interest in protecting public confidence in the na-
tion’s judiciary, furnish potent material for upholding a ban on false state-
ments by judicial candidates.437  Moreover, the Williams-Yulee Court’s ac-
commodating version of strict scrutiny offers additional encouragement to 
champions of this prohibition.  Viewed in context, however, Williams-
Yulee’s pronouncements and analysis do not appear to have a far-reaching 
impact on White’s legacy of robust protection for judicial candidates’ cam-
paign speech.  Indeed, the opinion pointedly refrains from calling White into 
question.  Rather, the holding should be understood in the light of distinctive 
concerns raised by judicial candidates’ direct solicitation of funds.  If the ra-
tionale for this restriction overlaps to any appreciable degree with the basis 
for other limitations on candidates’ speech, it is with provisions other than 
the misrepresent clause. 
Williams-Yulee addressed the constitutionality of Florida’s solicitation 
clause providing that judicial candidates “shall not personally solicit cam-
paign funds . . . but may establish committees of responsible persons” to raise 
money for election campaigns.438  As a candidate for a county court seat, 
Williams-Yulee (“Yulee”) had violated this prohibition by mailing and post-
ing online a letter soliciting contributions to her campaign.439  The Florida 
Supreme Court rejected Yulee’s challenge to her reprimand and fine, con-
cluding that the ban on candidates’ solicitation advanced the state’s compel-
ling interest in “preserving the integrity of [its] judiciary and maintaining the 
public’s confidence in an impartial judiciary,”440 and was narrowly tailored 
to that interest because it “insulate[s] judicial candidates from the solicitation 
and receipt of funds while leaving open, ample alternative means for candi-
dates to raise the resources necessary to run their campaigns.”441 
In affirming the Florida court’s judgment, the Supreme Court approv-
ingly noted the interests that that court had articulated to support the ban.442  
For the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Roberts, it was “intuitive” for 
                                                          
 436.  See Myers v. Thompson, 192 F. Supp. 3d 1129, 1141–42 (D. Mont. 2016) (applying prin-
ciple of Williams-Yulee in dismissing action under First Amendment for injunctive relief against 
enforcement of state’s ban on false statements by judicial candidates). 
 437.  See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1659 (2015). 
 438.  Id. at 1663 (quoting FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(C)(1)). 
 439.  Id.  
 440.  Id. at 1664 (alteration in original) (quoting Fla. Bar v. Williams-Yulee, 138 So. 3d 379, 
384 (Fla. 2014)). 
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Florida and other states to respond in this way to the prospect that “the public 
may lack confidence in a judge’s ability to administer justice without fear or 
favor if he comes to office by asking for favors.”443  Explaining the validity 
of a ban presumably unacceptable in legislative and executive elections, 
Chief Justice Roberts affirmed that “States may regulate judicial elections 
differently than they regulate political elections, because the role of judges 
differs from the role of politicians.”444  Because the judiciary is the branch 
most dependent on public respect for its authority, public perception of judi-
cial integrity is “a state interest of the highest order.”445 
Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged, however, that the judiciary’s dis-
tinctive character did not warrant suspension of ordinary First Amendment 
principles,446 and that therefore strict scrutiny applied to this restriction on 
judicial candidates’ speech.447  Although few speech restrictions could sur-
vive this exacting review,448 the narrowly tailored means through which the 
solicitation clause advanced the state’s compelling interest in preserving pub-
lic confidence in the judiciary’s integrity made this one of those “rare 
cases.”449  In particular, the Court first dismissed Yulee’s contention that the 
ban was underinclusive because it allowed activity inflicting comparable 
harm on judicial integrity and its appearance: e.g., solicitation of money by a 
judge’s campaign committee.450  Rather than insist that the state comprehen-
sively address each possible threat to this interest, it sufficed that the ban 
“aims squarely at the conduct most likely to undermine public confidence in 
the integrity of the judiciary: personal requests for money by judges and ju-
dicial candidates.”451  The Court also rejected Yulee’s argument that the re-
striction swept in too much speech.452  Quite the opposite: The Court detailed 
the vast range of means by which judicial candidates could engage their sup-
porters and the public.453  Even the bar to direct requests for money could be 
                                                          
 443.  Id. 
 444.  Id. at 1667 (citing Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 783 (2002)); see also 
id. at 1662 (“[A] State’s decision to elect its judiciary does not compel it to treat judicial candidates 
like campaigners for political office.”). 
 445.  Id. at 1666 (quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 889 (2009)). 
 446.  Id. at 1667 (“[T]he First Amendment fully applies to Yulee’s speech.”). 
 447.  Id. at 1665. 
 448.  Id. at 1665–66 (“We have emphasized that ‘it is the rare case’ in which a State demonstrates 
that a speech restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.” (quoting Burson v. 
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 449.  Id. at 1666. 
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largely circumvented by delegating this function to committees.454  Moreo-
ver, any effort to selectively ban candidates’ solicitation according to whether 
a particular mode threatened the state’s interests would be unworkable.455  Fi-
nally, the Court found similarly unfeasible Yulee’s proposal of recusal rules 
that would remove from cases judges who might be compromised by a 
party’s or attorney’s contributions.456  A liberal recusal policy would trigger 
a “flood of postelection recusal motions” and spur calculating litigants to 
make campaign contributions for the very purpose of later forcing recipients 
to recuse themselves.457 
With differences aired by both the concurrence and the dissents, Chief 
Justice Roberts’s opinion was criticized at once for being too hard and too 
lenient on judicial campaign speech restrictions.  For her part, Justice Gins-
burg renewed her argument from her dissenting opinion in White458 for more 
authority by states to regulate judicial campaigns than other types.459  In Wil-
liams-Yulee, she expressed particular anxiety about applying to judicial cam-
paigns the same license to spend that the Court’s intervening decisions in 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission460 and McCutcheon v. Fed-
eral Election Commission461 had granted in political campaigns.462  Con-
versely, the four dissenters all accused the Chief Justice of applying a weak 
and spurious form of strict scrutiny—most vividly when Justice Alito char-
acterized Florida’s rule as “about as narrowly tailored as a burlap bag.”463 
                                                          
 454.  Id. 
 455.  Id. at 1671. 
 456.  Id. 
 457.  Id. at 1671–72. 
 458.  See supra note 259 and accompanying text. 
 459. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct.. at 1673 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).  For this reason, Justice 
Ginsburg refused to join the portion of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion calling for the application 
of strict scrutiny.  Id. at 1675 (arguing that rather than having to choose between “equating judicial 
elections to political elections” and “abandoning public participation in the selection of judges al-
together,” states should be permitted to “balance the constitutional interests in judicial integrity and 
free expression within the unique setting of an elected judiciary” (quoting Republican Party of 
Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 821 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting))). 
 460.  558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 461.  134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). 
 462.  Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1673–75. 
 463.  Id. at 1685 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1677 (Scalia, Thomas, JJ., dissenting) 
(attributing the Court’s decision upholding the ban on solicitation to “applying the appearance of 
strict scrutiny” (emphasis added)); id. at 1685 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Court’s 
opinion creates a blueprint for “eviscerating strict scrutiny any time the Court encounters speech it 
dislikes”). 
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If perhaps somewhat overstated,464 the dissenters’ objections were not 
without foundation.465  At minimum, the Court seized upon a relatively gen-
erous formulation of strict scrutiny, plucking from an earlier opinion uphold-
ing a restriction subject to strict scrutiny the assertion that a limitation on 
speech need not be “perfectly tailored” to its objective.466  More strikingly, 
in deflecting the charge of underinclusiveness with the proposition that “[a] 
State need not address all aspects of a problem in one fell swoop,”467 the 
Court employed language more closely associated with the permissive ra-
tional relationship standard than with strict scrutiny.468  The contrast with 
White’s stern application of strict scrutiny469 is difficult to ignore. 
Nor does the Court’s analysis in Williams-Yulee square comfortably 
with White in other ways.  Williams-Yulee’s embrace of shifting notions of 
judicial integrity bears little resemblance to the Court’s methodical parsing 
of Minnesota’s asserted interest in impartiality in White.470  Additionally, the 
state’s stake in preserving the appearance of judicial probity—at best a sub-
sidiary interest in White471—takes center stage in Chief Justice Robert’s jus-
tification of the solicitation clause.472  Most fundamentally, the Court’s opin-
ion sharpens the line that had been blurred in White between judges and other 
elected officials under the First Amendment.  This outlook is captured in the 
                                                          
 464.  See, e.g., id. at 1676 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court flattens one settled First Amend-
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 472.  See Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1671 (majority opinion) (“Florida has reasonably deter-
mined that personal appeals for money by a judicial candidate inherently create an appearance of 
impropriety that may cause the public to lose confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.”); Michael 
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PUB. POL’Y 397, 398–99 (2016) (contrasting Williams-Yulee’s emphasis on appearance with 
White’s roots in “reality”). 
 2018] JUDICIAL CANDIDATES’ RIGHT TO LIE 831 
 
Chief Justice’s blunt declaration that “a State has compelling interests in reg-
ulating judicial elections that extend beyond its interests in regulating politi-
cal elections, because judges are not politicians.”473 
Nevertheless, it would be overreading Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion 
to conclude that it represents a repudiation of White’s underlying principles.  
On the contrary, the opinion cites White a half-dozen times.  Indeed, Justice 
Ginsburg withheld her concurrence from Part II of the opinion for the express 
reason that that section endorsed White’s strict scrutiny standard.474  Thus, 
Williams-Yulee should be seen rather as implementing White’s reservation of 
the possibility that judicial elections could be subject to heightened regula-
tion in certain instances.475 
It is easy to see why the Court would recognize solicitation by judicial 
candidates as one of those “rare cases.”476  The potential damage to impar-
tiality and the appearance of fairness from candidates asking for money dif-
fers in kind from the dangers posed by the speech barred by the announce 
clause struck down in White.  This may help to account for the presence of 
the solicitation clause in the judicial conduct codes of all thirty-nine states 
with judicial offices subject to some form of election477; only nine states had 
still retained an announce clause when White was decided.478  Prohibition of 
judicial candidates’ solicitation provides an unusually manageable remedy to 
a distinctive threat to the fact and perception of judicial impartiality.479  More-
over, the concerns animating the solicitation clause bear even less resem-
blance to the rationale for the misrepresent clause than that of the announce 
clause. 
The particular dangers posed by candidates directly requesting funds for 
their campaigns are even further removed from the evils to which the mis-
represent clause are addressed.  Personal solicitation by the candidate con-
tains a coercive undertone that a third party’s solicitation does not.480  More 
broadly, states may act on the premise that a candidate’s personal solicitation 
“creates a categorically different and more severe risk of undermining public 
                                                          
 473.  Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1672.  But see id. at 1683 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing 
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confidence than does solicitation by a campaign committee.”481  Thus, rather 
than granting states a free-float commission to monitor candidates to ensure 
their compliance with generalized notions of “integrity,” Williams-Yulee spe-
cifically addresses “the regrettable but unavoidable appearance that judges 
who personally ask for money may diminish their integrity.”482 
Nor does the Court’s opinion amount to a categorical and unreflective 
acceptance of judicial exceptionalism.  Rather, distinctive and devastating 
harm is inflicted on the judiciary’s core mission by “a public perception that 
the judiciary is being bought.”483  Citizens accept—if grudgingly—the inev-
itability that donors to political campaigns will exert outsized influence on 
the candidates whom they help to elect.  As Williams-Yulee recognized, how-
ever, it is an altogether more corrosive effect on a major branch of govern-
ment when “the public may lack confidence in a judge’s ability to administer 
justice without fear or favor [because] he comes to office by asking for fa-
vors.”484  Accordingly, the Court noted that “our precedents applying the First 
Amendment to political elections have little bearing on the issues here.”485 
Even if Williams-Yulee is not quite “much ado about nothing,”486 then, 
its limited implications487 do not reach the misrepresent clause.  The purpose 
of the misrepresent clause includes no counterpart to the potential quid pro 
quo of a candidate’s solicitation and the contribution it elicits.  Likewise, the 
remedy of counterspeech as an alternative to censorship of alleged falsehoods 
cannot combat the potential harm to impartiality and its appearance inherent 
in candidates’ personal requests for contributions.  Nor does a bar to candi-
dates’ solicitation of money go to the heart of content-based restrictions in a 
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way that a blanket ban on falsehoods does.  Finally, the appearance of cor-
ruption that the solicitation clause is designed to avert—wholly outside the 
realm of the misrepresent clause—summons up an abiding principle of law: 
“justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.”488 
V.  CONCLUSION 
To contend that the Constitution protects dishonesty by judicial candi-
dates is not an exercise in cynicism.  Rather, acknowledgement of this pro-
tection brings into focus the costs of the widespread practice of choosing 
judges by popular vote.  Like the rising tide of spending and vitriol that have 
infected judicial elections, the license to lie throws into sharp relief the gap 
between ideals of justice and realities of politics.  It is often observed that 
society can be required to pay a heavy price for freedom of speech.  Permit-
ting those who would administer the laws of the land to deploy falsehood as 
a tactic seems a particularly lamentable byproduct of the First Amendment.  
That this price could be avoided by choosing judges through other means 
may yet affect the modes of judicial selection. 
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